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This thesis explains U.S. and German foreign policy decisions regarding Ukraine 
over the course of 1992–2015. Using theoretical models of foreign policy analysis and a 
method of structured-focused comparison, the research provides multi-causal 
explanations of crucial U.S. and German foreign policy decisions regarding Ukraine. 
They include the 1992–1994 Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, the 2008 NATO Bucharest 
Summit, and the Western response to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict that began in 
2014. The thesis provides a detailed comparative analysis of key factors that caused the 
emergence of American–German disunity regarding Ukraine. It concludes that divergent 
U.S. and German decisions regarding Ukraine appear in the dynamics of their changing 
power statuses and national security interests, as well as their dominant ideas and 
domestic politics. The inconsistency regarding Ukraine emerges when one or both states 
perceive Ukraine as a subsidiary part of each country’s bilateral relations with Russia. 
The results of the research are critical in evaluating U.S. and German efforts to prevent 
further escalation of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, avoid a new East–West confrontation, 
and ensure the reliability of the Euro–Atlantic security architecture. The results of the 
research also provide important background for the further development of the 
American–Ukrainian and German–Ukrainian strategic partnership.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What explains foreign policy decisions of the United States and Germany 
regarding Ukraine? What factors influence and constrain U.S. and German foreign policy 
options? This thesis examines whether a realist emphasis on a state’s relative power, a 
constructivist focus on dominant ideas, or domestic political competition among key 
decision makers carried the most weight in shaping U.S. and German foreign policy with 
respect to Ukraine. 
The thesis analyzes specific aspects of foreign relations through the dynamics of 
Ukraine’s bilateral relations with the United States and Germany in three case studies: 1) 
the 1992–94 Ukrainian nuclear disarmament; 2) the 2008 Bucharest North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit; and 3) the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that 
began in 2014. The research focuses on policy inputs and develops a multi-causal 
explanation of important foreign policy decisions. Clarifying the causes of certain foreign 
policy decisions on Ukraine will help illuminate the state of Ukraine’s bilateral relations 
with the West and potential for a rift in the Atlantic Alliance.   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Ukraine crisis is one the most serious crises in Europe since the end of the 
Cold War.1 Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the outbreak of war in 
eastern Ukraine a few months later have challenged the stability of post-1989 
international security order. Ukraine has suddenly become an important research subject 
for U.S. and European scholars.2 Located between Russia and NATO’s eastern borders, 
Ukraine now presents a geostrategic importance as an outpost against a dangerous 
aggressor. Scholars have debated whether it was Western active involvement or, on the 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Burns, “The Aspen Strategy Group on the Old and the New Cold War,” The Aspen Idea 
(Winter-2015), 63. 
2 Alexander Motyl, “The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine,” World Affairs 
(January/February 2015): 79. 
 2 
contrary, a weak Western foreign policy that prompted a Russian aggression against 
Ukraine.3 Russia’s actions raise the question whether the United States and Germany as 
leading nations are able to prevent further escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and 
ensure the reliability of Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Answering this question 
requires understanding what drives U.S. and German foreign policy decisions regarding 
Ukraine. The following section addresses explanations offered in the international 
relations literature.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When seeking existing explanations for U.S. and German foreign policy regarding 
Ukraine, there is little academic work specifically focused on bilateral relations with 
Ukraine. Most Western foreign policy scholarship work focuses on foreign policy 
regarding Russia, and mentions Ukraine only within that framework.4 Taras Kuzio notes 
that U.S. and German actions are the results of their post-Soviet focus on Russia, with 
“Ukraine regarded as merely an appendage of Russia.”5  
Only at significant security-related moments in post-Soviet Ukrainian history, 
such as the 1992–1994 bargaining process over Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, the 2008 
Bucharest NATO summit that dealt with the question of Ukrainian membership, and the 
ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that began in 2014 have prompted Western scholars to 
focus on the West’s foreign policy related to Ukraine. This scholarship offers a wide 
range of causes to explain U.S. and German policy decisions.  
                                                 
 3 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusion That 
Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2014): 1–12. Note: see also Motyl, “The Surrealism 
of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine.” 
4 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusion That 
Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2014); Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany’s Commercial 
Realism and the Russia Problem,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (October–November 2014); 
William Wallace, “European Foreign Policy since the Cold War: How Ambitious, How Inhibited?,” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 1 (2017). Tuomas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to 
‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 
(2016), and others. 
5 Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy: The Washington Papers/167 (Washington, DC: The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1995). 
 3 
Upon Ukraine’s independence in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
following year, scholarly attention turned to the question of Soviet nuclear weapons now 
on Ukrainian sovereign soil.6 The process of nuclear disarmament became the main 
foreign policy agenda item of the United States and Germany toward Ukraine. In Western 
eyes, any Ukrainian attempt to establish control over nuclear weapons would mean 
isolation and possible withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the state.7 In addition, in 
1993, Germany clearly stated that it would develop closer relations with Ukraine only 
after nuclear disarmament.8 The events around the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit 
provoked another burst of academic interest in Ukraine, due to the difference in U.S. and 
German foreign policy choices regarding Ukraine’s membership in NATO.9 Despite 
President Bush’s support for Ukraine entering the Membership Action Plan, Germany’s 
opposition is argued to have played a vital role and caused the failure of NATO to extend 
Ukraine an invitation to Membership Action Plan (MAP), while stating that Ukraine 
would “one day” attain membership.10  
In 2014, the emergence of the Russia-Ukraine crisis provoked a fresh series of 
scholarly work attempting to explain the U.S. and German responses and their foreign 
policy choices regarding both Ukraine and Russia. This work focuses in particular on 
three aspects of U.S. and German responses: First, the ambivalent U.S. response, given 
the existing security commitments to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum on 
                                                 
6 Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy: The Washington Papers/167; Sherman Garnett, Keystone in the 
Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997); Steven Woehrel, Ukraine: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. 
Interests: CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, March 15, 1994); Roman 
Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations: McNair Paper 55 (Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1996), and others. 
7 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 
(1993): 58; Mariana Budjeryn, “Was Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder,” World Affairs (Summer 
2016): 13. 
8 Angela Stent, “Ukraine and Germany: Toward a New Partnership?” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 23, 
no. 1 (December 1, 1997): 292. 
9 Dieter Mahncke, “The United States, Germany and France: Balancing Transatlantic Relations,” 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2009); Jeffrey Simon, “Ukraine Against Herself: To 
be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral,” Strategic Forum (February 2009); Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s 
Relations with the West since the Orange Revolution,” European Security (September 2012). 
10 Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Relations with the West since the Orange Revolution,” 401. 
 4 
Security Assurances,11 manifest in U.S. decisions to support Ukraine only through 
financial and limited military aid and economic sanctions against Russia;12 second, 
Germany’s active opposition to any military response to Russia’s aggression and 
hesitation about imposing economic sanctions against the aggressor;13 and third, 
Germany’s active involvement in peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia as the 
leading European mediator.14 
When explaining the aforementioned foreign policy choices related to Ukraine 
and its conflict with Russia, scholars propose a number of explanations emphasizing 
realist, constructivist, domestic, societal, psychological, and personality inputs that could 
shape the U.S. and German decisions in the dynamics of Russia-Ukraine conflict. Many 
scholars explore multi-causal explanations of U.S. and German foreign policy decisions 
concerning Ukraine.15 From this scholarship, we can extract explanations dealing with 
material power, the ideas that inform foreign policy, the nature of political institutions 
involved in foreign policy decision making, and organized interest groups. These are the 
factors that shape the hypotheses regarding the causes of U.S. and German foreign policy 
here. 
The scholarship concerning U.S. and German foreign policy regarding Ukraine 
can be categorized more generally as realist, constructivist, and liberal explanations that 
emphasize the state or societal level of analysis. In international relations theory, foreign 
                                                 
11 David S. Yost, “The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine,” International 
Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015). 
12 Vincent L. Morelli, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service 
(March 29, 2016). 
13 Matthias Matthijs, “The Three Faces of German Leadership,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 
58, no. 2 (April–May 2016): 147.  
14 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role,” Foreign Relations (July/August 2016). 
15 Hans Kundnani, “Germany Rethinking Its Role in the World,” Current History (March 2015); 
Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role”; Matthijs, “The Three Faces of German Leadership”; Jeffrey 
Gedmin, “The Case for Berlin,” Bringing Germany Back to the West, World Affairs (November/December 
2014); Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany’s Commercial Realism and the Russia Problem,” Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy (October–November 2014); William Wallace, “European Foreign Policy since the 
Cold War: How Ambitious, How Inhibited?,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, 
no. 1 (2017); Tuomas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign 
Policy towards Russia,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016), and others. 
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policy is held to be best explained at the state or societal level of analysis.16 In terms of 
explanatory power, this level of analysis provides a deeper image of international 
relations and allows more detailed investigation of the policy-making process.17 At the 
domestic level, realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches focus on material 
capabilities, ideas, identities, domestic political competiton, interest groups, epistemic 
communities, and institutional structures to explain foreign policy choices. Hence, they 
allow examination of how material capabilites, ideational factors, domestic political 
competiton, interest groups, and mass publics may create foreign policy decisions. 
a. Material Power and Realism 
Realism draws a pessimistic picture of international politics. Realists assume that 
the international system is anarchic and consists of separate political units not 
subordinated to any higher central power. As a result, states must ensure their own 
survival. This in turn defines the national interest in acquiring wealth and military 
capabilities and allies in order to ensure survival. These capabilities in their turn pose a 
potential danger to other states’ survival, creating a security dilemma, as an increase in 
one state’s ability to secure itself increases other state’s sense of insecurity.18 Classical 
realists usually explain foreign policy decisions by focusing on the distribution of 
material power among states.19 Neoclassical realist theorists build on this insight, holding 
that foreign policy of a state is driven by its relative power but this effect “is indirect and 
complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level 
variables such as decision makers’ perceptions and state structure.”20 Realist would 
fundamentally expect the material capabilities of the United States, Germany, Russia, and 
                                                 
16 Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 83–84. 
17 Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 90. 
18 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, 
no. 3 (Winter 1994–1995), 10. 
19 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16; Note: Classical realists: Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Kissinger, Arnold Wolfers, and others. 
20 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 
(October 1998): 144–177; Note: neoclassical realists include Thomas Christensen, Randall Shweller, 
William Wolfforth, Fareed Zakaria, Gideon Rose, and others. 
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Ukraine to weigh heavily in shaping foreign policy. Realism, however, is not dependent 
on whether the United States and Germany would seek to balance against or appease 
Russia with respect to Ukraine. 
Many explanations of the U.S. and German foreign policy choices concerning 
Ukraine in early post-Cold War period focus on realist factors such as maintaining the 
existing nuclear nonproliferation regime, including preventing a dangerous precedent for 
further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and removing the significant threat posed by the 
newly Ukrainian nuclear arsenal.21 With respect to NATO’s 2008 decision not to extend 
a MAP to Ukraine, Dieter Mahncke emphasizes the role of each country’s broader 
national interests, where Germany is “strongly economically oriented in its foreign policy 
objectives,” while the United States continues to spread its global American presence.22 
Jeffrey Simon proposes a realist explanation of Germany’s behavior in rejecting 
Ukrainian membership in NATO, suggesting that Russia’s tactics of intimidating Europe 
with a new energy crisis shaped German policy makers’ decisions, in ways unfavorable 
to Ukraine.23 With respect to the current Russia-Ukraine conflict, John J. Mearsheimer 
underlines the role of national interest as a shaping factor: “The United States and its 
European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their 
unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved.”24 Mark Fitzpatrick 
similarly argues that, “for the [United States], the Korean Peninsula is a priority; the 
Crimea Peninsula is not.”25 
b. Ideas, Epistemic Communities, and Constructivism 
Constructivists argue that not just material factors and power politics influence 
international relations, but that ideas and identities also play a significant role. Alexander 
                                                 
21 Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” 59–61. 
22 Mahncke, “The United States, Germany and France: Balancing Transatlantic Relations,” 82. 
23 Simon, “Ukraine Against Herself: To be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral,” 5. 
24 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusion That 
Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2014): 12. 
25 Mark Fitzpatrick, “The Ukraine Crisis and Nuclear Order,” Survival 56, no. 4 (August–September 
2014): 86. 
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Wendt puts forward two main aspects of constructivism: that “the structures of human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that 
the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
than given by nature.”26 In general, proponents of social constructivism focus on the 
impact of social norms, political and economic ideas, and cultural practices and values on 
political life as these variables determine interests.27 Thus, scholars have to understand 
these variables in order to know what interests actors actually have, rather than assuming 
what those interests are, as realists and liberals usually do.28 
Constructivists focus on the ideas at play in domestic politics that yield national 
interests and foreign policy choices; they tend to stress the role of domestic or 
organizational identities, norms and ideas in shaping foreign policy interests and 
decisions. In addition, while constructivists share the belief that interests imply choices, 
these choices may be constrained by social practices, actor identities, and societal 
norms.29 Hence, in the case of the foreign policy, state actions could be constrained by 
domestic and international social practices. In sum, the constructivist approach allows 
scholars to determine the differences among states, as states “behave differently toward 
other states, based on the identity of each.” Constructivists, therefore, “expect different 
patterns of behavior across groups of states with different identities and interests.”30 
Within constructivism, the epistemic community literature focuses on the role of 
scientific ideas in shaping foreign policy outcomes. According to Peter Haas, epistemic 
communities represent a “network of knowledge-based experts” including scholars, think 
tanks, and other professionals who have “prestige, and reputation for expertise” and may 
have “influence over policy debates” through provision of alternative policy proposals to 
                                                 
26 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 1; Note: Constructivists include Alexander Wendt, John Gerard Ruggie, Martha Finnemore, 
Peter J. Katzenstein, Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, Ted Hopf, and others. 
27 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 15. 
28 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 174. 
29 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 176–177. 
30 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 193. 
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key decision makers.31 Epistemic communities can play a decisive role when decision 
makers experience uncertainty about the proper response to emerging global 
challenges.32 Scientific knowledge produced by epistemic communities in such 
circumstances can shape domestic and international policy processes, as well as the 
definition of states’ interests.33 Finally, “epistemic communities also shape the stage of 
policy choice because they use their professional experience to lay out the consequences 
of different courses of action as well as of not acting.”34 Emanuel Adler demonstrates 
how scientists at Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and their 
Soviet counterparts “invented” the idea of nuclear arms control and mutually assured 
destruction. These experts were able to demonstrate to U.S. and Soviet policy makers that 
limiting nuclear arms and counterintuitively making their society vulnerable to the 
other’s second-strike weapons would actually stabilize the U.S.-Soviet security 
dilemma.35  
Constructivists would expect arms control epistemic communities actively to seek 
to shape U.S. and German behavior regarding Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. They would 
also expect commonly shared ideas to shape decision making. Some scholars find that a 
widespread “russophilism and nostalgia for Russia” exists among German political elites, 
creating preferences and interests not in favor of newly independent Ukraine.36 Kuzio 
offers a constructivist explanation of NATO’s failure to extend a Membership Action 
plan to Ukraine, arguing that George W. Bush administration followed the ideology of 
NATO enlargement to the East in order to expand the zone of the democracy to the post-
Soviet countries, while Germany openly performed the ideology that opposed NATO and 
                                                 
31 Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 
International Organization 46 (Winter): 2–3. 
32 Anne L. Clunan, “Epistemic Community,” in Encyclopedia of Governance (University of 
California, Berkeley: Sage Publications), 278. 
33 Clunan, “Epistemic Community,” 278. 
34 Clunan, “Epistemic Community,” 278–279. 
35 Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the 
International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control.” International Organization 46, no. 1. 
(Winter, 1992): 101–145. 
36 Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy: The Washington Papers/167, 62. 
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European Union (EU) enlargement to the East.37 Others explain that Germany’s post-
World War II ideology of pacifism and subsequent normative and civilian foreign policy 
significantly constrains Germany’s decisions over military means in conflict resolution.38 
c. Liberalism 
Liberalism comprises a broad set of  theories of domestic politics that seek to 
identify factors that cause state behavior unexplained by systemic approaches.39 Liberal 
theorists focus both on the effect of a country’s political regime and on the domestic 
politics that yield political coalitions in their explanations of foreign policy.40 For 
example, presidential systems may produce different foreign policies from parliamentary 
systems.41 Leaders, when negotiating in the international arena, take into account 
domestic political institutions, various groups preferences, and coalitions.42  For 
democracies, the structure of political institutions and interest groups are often seen to be 
decisive in shaping foreign policy, so these explanations are developed in more depth 
here. 
d. Foreign Policy Making Institutions in Democracies 
The existence of either a coalitional parliamentary democracy or a presidential 
democracy may create advantages or constraints in foreign policy decision making. In 
parliamentary systems, coalitional governments are always at risk of breaking down and 
thus require significant bargaining and compromise among the various parties. In 
                                                 
37 Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Relations with the West since the Orange Revolution,” 401, 403. 
38 Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role,” Foreign Relations (July/August 2016): 110; Liana Fix 
and Steven Keil, “Berlin’s Foreign Policy Dilemma: A Paradigm Shift in Volatile Times,” U.S.-Europe 
Analysis Series, no. 58 (Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, February 16, 2017): 3. 
39 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 34. 
40 Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 32, 39. 
41 Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1967). 
42 Note: a number of scholars believe in a plurality of domestic factors: Robert D. Putnam, 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organizations 42, no. 3 
(1988): 427–460; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, with Arnold Kanter, 
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presidential systems, these constraints on the executive are absent, and the foreign policy 
makers are subordinated to the president.43 Scholars suggest that coalitional cabinets, on 
the other hand, “seek middle-of-the-road positions and compromises designed to secure 
legislative approval,” as they need to get the support and consensus of different political 
parties and groups.44  
With respect to Germany, its consistution hold that, “[t]he Federal Chancellor 
shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy. Within these 
limits, each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department independently 
and on his own responsibility.”45 In fact, ministries usually do not just follow the 
chancellor’s directives but are able to shape a policy taking into account their interests 
and priorities.46 Members of the government have “an interactive effect, meaning that 
their impact on outcomes varies, depending on the nature of power and interests.”47 In 
practice, the chancellor and the minister of foreign affairs are the main actors in the 
sphere of foreign policy making. However, as William Paterson writes, “a foreign 
minister has the advantage of inheriting a huge specialist ministry with embassies around 
the globe…[and] unlike a chancellor can devote almost all his/her time to foreign affairs 
while a chancellor has a quite different and hectic schedule.”48 Reimund Seidelmann 
explains that the foreign policy bargaining process usually is built around the traditional 
division of competencies between ministries, and the final decision remains the 
responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office and the Chancellery.49 In practice, 
Seidelmann emphasizes, the Chancellery often overrules the foreign ministry as it is in 
                                                 
43 Miriam Fendius Elman, “Unpacking Democracy: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theories of 
Democratic Peace,” Security Studies, 9, 4 (Summer 2000): 96. 
44 Elman, “Unpacking Democracy,” 99. 
45 German Bundestag, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 65. 
46 Katy A. Crossley-Frolick, “Domestic Constraints, German Foreign Policy and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding,” German Politics and Society, issue 108, vol. 31, no. 2 (Autumn 2013), 61. 
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48 William E. Paterson, “Foreign Policy in the Grand Coalition,” quoted in Szabo, Germany, Russia 
and the Rise of Geo-Economics, 41–42. 
49 Reimund Seidelmann, The New Germany: History, Economy, Policies (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2011), 299. 
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charge of defining key foreign policy guidelines such as special German-Russian 
relations.50 Seidelmann notes that Germany usually has a coalition government with 
shared responsibilities: a smaller coalition party gets the post of foreign minister, while 
the main party is responsible for the Chancellery. Thus, the interagency bargaining 
process often reflects intra-coalition relations, allowing the foreign minister to strengthen 
his or her position in the debates that may influence the coalition’s cohesion.51  
e. Interest Group Politics  
Many scholars of international relations emphasize the significant impact of 
organized interest groups on state’s foreign policy.52 According to their views, various 
domestic groups influence foreign policy decisions using their members’ votes, financial 
contributions, labor strikes, and other means to achieve their prefereed ends. Norrin M. 
Ripsman believes that “in democratic states, we should expect the greatest influence from 
well-organized, coherent, vote-rich, single-issue interest groups that can provide an 
electoral payoff…[these are] groups that can frame executive thinking on foreign 
affairs.”53 Some organized groups may affect foreign policy indirectly through 
parliaments, whose representatives may be dependent on demands from their specific 
groups of voters or campaign donors.54 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, 
exploring the influence of different actors on U.S. foreign policy, determine that 
“business may exert the most consistent influence on government officials but that 
policymakers’ views may also be affected by labor, experts, and, to a lesser extent, public 
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opinion.”55 For example, William Wallace emphasizes the role of interest groups, 
explaining that the U.S. decision to involve Ukraine in NATO enlargement process was 
“pressed forward by conservative Washington think tanks..”56 
Tuomas Forsberg, analyzing Germany’s foreign policy related to Russia during 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict, emphasizes three main domestic/societal inputs: government 
coalitions and leadership, interest groups, and public opinion.57 Forsberg argues that “the 
Social Democrats are more willing to follow the cooperative Ostpolitik tradition than the 
Christian Democrats.” In terms of the business lobby, Forsberg notes that during the 
Ukraine crisis, German business resisted sanctions against Russia at the first stage, but 
later accepted them. Public opinion about Russia reflected these changes in the same way 
as Germany’s policy.58  
D. HYPOTHESES AND POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS  
The scholarly literature provides a number of different explanations of foreign 
policy choices of the United States and Germany concerning Ukraine. They focus mainly 
on the two countries’ material power position relative to Russia and Ukraine, ideational 
factors, and domestic politics (foreign policy-making institutions and organized interest 
groups). As these factors may provide the best explanation of foreign policy choices, they 
are developed in this research.  
Hypothesis 1. Broadly speaking, realists would expect U.S. and German foreign 
policy to be driven by each country’s power position and security interests relative to 
Russia, with Ukraine viewed as a subsidiary part of each country’s bilateral relations with 
Russia.  
                                                 
55 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (February 2005): 121. 
56 Wallace, “European Foreign Policy since the Cold War: How Ambitious, How Inhibited?,” 85. 
57 Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards 
Russia,” 38. 
58 Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards 
Russia,” 39. 
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Defensive realists would expect the United States and Germany to carry out a 
foreign policy concerning Ukraine that fulfills its security interests in balancing Russian 
power and aligning Russia with U.S. interests, while offensive realists would expect the 
United States and Germany to use every opportunity to weaken Russia’s influence in 
Ukraine and to use Ukraine to isolate Russia. Given Russia’s greater military power and 
proximity to Germany, realists would expect Germany either a) to be more deferential to 
Russian interests and seek to bandwagon with it against the United States, and to elevate 
its relations with Russia over its relations with Ukraine; or b) to align closely with the 
United States, and follow its lead regarding Russia and Ukraine. Neoclassical realists 
would expect domestic political factors, such as some of those outlined later in this 
section, to additionally influence each country’s policy toward Ukraine. In this manner, a 
realist explanation may complement those below. 
Hypothesis 2. Constructivists would expect widely shared ideas in the United 
States and Germany to drive their foreign policy choices with respect to Ukraine. 
In the United States and Germany, such ideas might include the ideas of “the 
democratic peace” or “liberal zone of peace,” neoconservatism, multilateralism, pacifism, 
Europeanism, or pragmatic internationalism.59 For example, if the idea that democracy, 
economic integration, and institutionalization promotes peace is dominant in the United 
States or Germany, then their foreign policy regarding Ukraine should be in the form of 
supporting Ukraine’s (and eventually Russia’s) membership in NATO and the EU and its 
democratic transition. If the idea of pragmatic internationalism is dominant, then we 
would expect the foreign policy of both countries to favor limited involvement in 
Ukraine’s political situation. 
Hypothesis 3. From a domestic politics perspective, scholars should expect 
foreign policy concerning Ukraine to be the outcome of a bargaining process between 
government decision makers and the influence of organized interest groups to differ 
based on whether it is a presidential or parliamentary democracy.  
                                                 
 59 Munevver Stewart Cebeci et al., Issues in EU and U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2011); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001). 
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Hypothesis 3a. From a presidential versus parliamentary perspective, foreign 
policy decisions are shaped first by the structure of the political system. In the U.S. 
presidential system, scholars would expect foreign policy related to Ukraine to be the 
outcome of decisions within a strong executive, where members of the government are 
subordinated to one top leader. In the German parliamentary system, scholars would 
expect foreign policy decisions about Ukraine to be the outcome of political comprises 
within coalitional cabinets, where members of the government usually seek middle 
ground decisions to keep a consensus among different political parties and ensure further 
electoral support. If one party wins outright, then foreign policy decisions should reflect 
the party platform and personal preferences of members of the cabinet. 
In the United States, decisions on Ukraine depend on whether central decision 
makers are able to influence the president, who either accepts alternative proposals or 
makes unilateral decisions based on his personal views on Ukraine. If certain 
governmental actors are able to persuade the highest leader that Ukraine presents a 
geopolitical interest, then scholars would expect U.S. foreign policy choices in favor of 
Ukraine. If certain governmental actors are able to persuade the highest leader that Russia 
is more important for the United States, then scholars would expect the foreign policy of 
limited interest and lower involvement in Ukraine. In Germany, decisions toward 
Ukraine depend on whether the federal chancellor governs via a coalition cabinet or a 
single-party cabinet. In the former case, the chancellor is likely to share foreign policy 
making with a foreign minister who represents a crucial faction of the coalition. 
Decisions toward Ukraine are therefore likely to be the outcomes of a compromise 
between the chancellor and foreign minister.  
Hypothesis 3b. From the interest groups perspective, scholars would expect 
foreign policy regarding Ukraine to be the outcome of the influence of various interest 
groups with interests in Ukraine and Russia, including private businesses, labor unions, 
and lobbies in the United States and Germany.  
In the United States and Germany, if organized business lobbies that have 
economic interests in Russia are able to influence U.S. or German decision makers to 
protect their economic welfare, then scholars would expect limited U.S. or German 
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involvement in Ukraine-Russia disputes. If business groups with economic interests in 
Ukraine are able to influence U.S. or German decision makers to protect them from 
commercial risks, then scholars would expect supportive U.S. or German foreign policy 
choices toward Ukraine.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analytical approach of this thesis is to explain foreign policy decisions of the 
United States and Germany regarding Ukraine from the U.S. and Western European 
perspective. The basic analytical approach of this thesis is to use paired case studies of 
U.S. and German decision making regarding three events: 1) the 1992–1994 Ukrainian 
nuclear disarmament; 2) the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit; and 3) the current Russia-
Ukraine conflict that began in 2014. These occasions present three of the most important 
events of modern Ukrainian history since its independence in 1991. Furthermore, they 
have provoked a debate among scholars and policy makers about how these decisions 
were made and under what factors.  
In evaluating each hypothesis for each of the three events, the research applies 
inferential analysis to U.S. and German decision making to determine which of the 
potential explanations is compatible with “an uninterrupted chain of evidence from 
hypothesized cause to observed effect.”60 The thesis uses the method of structured-
focused comparison of cases to determine causation by examining German and U.S. 
decision making in detail.61 The empirical chapters apply the same set of hypotheses to 
U.S. and German decision making in each case. Summing up the results of the research, 
the thesis assesses the causal variables that played a primary and secondary role in each 
of the six decisions. On this basis, the thesis evaluates which of the research hypotheses 
offers the best explanation for U.S. and German behavior. 
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The thesis relies on primary sources, including official memoirs of decision 
makers, government documents and policy statements, published interviews with 
decision makers, and statistical data, as well as the secondary scholarly literature and 
press.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The remainder of the thesis is organized into four chapters, comprising three 
paired case studies of U.S. and German decision making regarding Ukraine, and a chapter 
comparing the findings from these cases and offering conclusions. Chapter II focuses on 
the 1992–1994 Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, providing a review of the historical event 
and evaluating the three general explanations for the United States and Germany’s 
decisions during the process. Following the same logic, Chapter III explores the 2008 
Bucharest NATO Summit that considered Ukrainian membership in the alliance, and 
Chapter IV examines the ongoing conflict between Russian and Ukraine that began in 
2014. Finally, Chapter V analyzes the findings from Chapters II through IV, evaluates the 
primary causes of U.S. and German foreign policy towards Ukraine, and provides 
recommendations about the factors that should be taken into account in developing 






II. THE 1992–1994 UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
On June 1, 1996, the last Soviet warhead left the territory of Ukraine, marking the 
end of the issue of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament.62 The successful outcome of the 
process came after three years (1992–1994) of complex negotiations and decisions 
between Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and other Western countries. With the 
collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1991, Ukraine 
inherited a significant part of the Soviet military infrastructure created to conduct 
offensive actions against the United States, Germany (West Germany), and other NATO 
allies. A significant nuclear arsenal on Ukrainian soil presented a substantial threat to 
U.S. security as it was targeted at the United States.63 At the same time, there was 
concern that a nuclear Ukraine would cause Germany to build a nuclear arsenal,64 as well 
as the failure of U.S. and German non-proliferation efforts. “Ukraine`s evolution could 
have a profound influence on the post-Cold War security order”;65 hence, it was vital to 
reduce and transform Ukraine`s huge and disorganized military forces to ensure regional 
stability and prevent nuclear proliferation.  
This chapter explores U.S. and German foreign policy choices during the 1992–
1994 process of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament. It seeks to understand how the United 
States and Germany came to focus primarily on the nuclear agenda in bilateral relations 
with newly independent Ukraine. It evaluates how relative power positions, commonly 
held ideas, and domestic political structures and interests affected these foreign policy 
decisions.  
                                                 
62 Roman Popadiuk, “American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations,” McNair Paper 55 (Washington, DC: 
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A. UKRAINE’S NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
significantly changed the global security environment, curtailing the bipolar competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though the threat of a nuclear war 
between the two superpowers had been reduced, nuclear weapons located in former 
Soviet republics continued to pose a significant danger for both European and global 
security. After its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union left a huge arsenal of both strategic 
nuclear warheads and delivery systems in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.66 
Russia, which had declared itself the successor state to the Soviet Union in international 
treaties, was able in a relatively short period of time to conclude bilateral agreements 
with Belarus and Kazakhstan on the removal of strategic weapons from their territories. 
The process with Ukraine, however, was more complicated, making it the center of 
Western concerns about the former Soviet military apparatus.67 
On December 25, 1991, Ukraine not only became an independent state but also 
inherited the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world after the United States and 
Russia.68 According to former State Expert on the Analytical Service of the National 
Security and Defense Council Staff of Ukraine Leonid Polyakov: 
Ukraine inherited a large nuclear arsenal, with 220 strategic weapon 
carriers, including 176 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) (130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24 missiles) and 44 strategic bombers (19 
Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95). The overall nuclear potential of the strategic force 
was estimated at 1,944 strategic nuclear warheads, in addition to 2,500 
tactical nuclear weapons. The ICBMs were targeted at the United States 
and armed with multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, 
and every bomber carried long-range cruise missiles.69  
Tactical nuclear weapons presented an additional concern to the West, owing to the risks 
of their proliferation to extremist groups through smuggling or use during possible 
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emerging chaos and civil war in the post-Soviet republics.70 Consequently, the United 
States and Germany concentrated their foreign policy efforts regarding Ukraine on 
nuclear weapons and its nuclear disarmament.  
The Ukrainian nuclear disarmament process lasted three tense years, from1992 
until December 1994. While in early May 1992 Ukraine successfully transferred all 
tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, the same plan for strategic nuclear weapons had not 
worked.71 Ukraine as well as Kazakhstan faced deteriorating relations with Russia and 
both were seeking treatment equal with Russia from the West.72 In response, to find a 
consensus, the United States initiated making the three non-Russian Soviet nuclear 
republics a party of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), on the condition 
that they join the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and become 
non-nuclear states.73 In May 1992, Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol and became an 
independent party of START I, obligating itself to abandon strategic nuclear weapons 
and join the NPT.74 The protocol recognized Ukraine as one of the successor states of the 
Soviet Union, thus making the state an equal participant of further START I 
negotiations.75 
From 1992 to the spring of 1993, this outcome was in doubt, however. Sherman 
W. Garnett describes the period as “two years of misunderstanding and mutual 
recriminations.”76 Western powers preferred using political sticks toward Ukraine, 
pressuring the state to transfer its nuclear arsenal to Russia without taking into account 
Ukrainian security and economic concerns. Ukraine, on the other hand, desired to get 
particular security and economic benefits before giving up a huge nuclear arsenal. From a 
70 Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy: The Washington Papers/167, 95.
71 Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, 6.
72 Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, 6.
73 Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, 6.
74 Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, 7.
75 “Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Lisbon, May 23, 1992,  
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf  
76 Sherman Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central
and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 113. 
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security perspective, Ukraine after the Soviet collapse was worried about instability 
within Russia leading to threats to Ukrainian territory and sovereignty, especially given 
the huge presence of Soviet military forces and equipment in Ukraine, including the 
headquarters of the Soviet Navy Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. From an economic 
perspective, at a time when the Ukrainian economy of the early 1990s was in crisis, the 
strategic nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory presented a significant commercial 
value as they contained highly enriched uranium (HEU) that could be changed into low-
enriched uranium (LEU) for Ukrainian nuclear power plants.77 Steven Pifer, a former 
senior U.S. official who worked on these issues, writes that the Ukrainian government 
sought clear answers from the West and Russia to four key questions:78 What guarantees 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity would Ukraine obtain after nuclear disarmament? 
What compensation would Ukraine receive for the HEU? Who would compensate 
Ukraine for the expensive dismantlement of the intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), strategic bombers, and nuclear infrastructure? And, what would be the 
procedure and conditions of disarmament? 
 The United States and Germany, together with Russia, for two years maintained 
pressure on Ukraine for unconditional disarmament. For Yuri Shcherbak, a former 
Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, the question of Ukrainian non-nuclear status 
became the most confrontational issue of the period.79 He remembers those negotiations 
as “the first time that Ukrainian officials and diplomats faced such tough and consistent 
pressure from the world`s two nuclear superpowers.”80 At the same time, Germany 
clearly stated that it would develop closer relations with Ukraine only after nuclear 
disarmament.81  
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 However, by the spring of 1993 the Western strategy of ultimatums caused 
serious political opposition in Ukraine. Ukrainian parliamentarians believed that the West 
was using unfair pressure on Ukraine, demanding its quick ratification of the START I 
and the NPT.82 In addition, in their view, a number of issues, including the costs of 
dismantlement, environmental and social impacts, and growing concerns about Russia 
needed more detailed examination.83 Consequently, in April 1993, a group of 162 
members of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) signed an open statement 
declaring Ukraine’s status as a successor to the USSR and a nuclear power that has a 
“right of ownership of the nuclear weapons on its territory” that was seeking economic 
compensation and security guarantees in exchange for nuclear weapons elimination.84 
This coercive approach did not lead to success, leaving the problem of Ukrainian nuclear 
weapons for President William Clinton’s new administration. 
 The significant domestic opposition in Ukraine to unconditional nuclear 
disarmament led the United States and Germany in 1993 to reconsider their respective 
approaches toward the newly independent state. The visit of Strobe Talbott, then the U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large for the Newly Independent States, to Kyiv on May 1993 resulted in 
the broadening of the U.S. focus from the nuclear issue alone to economic assistance, 
military and defense contacts, and the review of political relations.85 In early June 1993, 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin also visited Kyiv and proposed a plan for the 
dismantling of nuclear systems in Ukraine that included international monitoring of the 
process, transfer, and final destruction of nuclear warheads.86 Two months later in 
August 1993, the Defense Minister of Germany, Volker Rühe, during his own visit to 
Ukraine, expressed German readiness to provide financial assistance for the dismantling 
of Ukrainian nuclear weapons if Ukraine ratified START I and joined the NPT.87 
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Furthermore, in late October 1993, then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s 
visit to Kyiv resulted in the conclusion of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
agreement that guaranteed financial assistance to Ukraine for dismantling its strategic 
nuclear weapons.88 Once the West shifted its approach toward Ukraine to using 
significant security and economic carrots instead of sticks, the process moved away from 
deadlock. 
 By the end of 1993, the long and complex U.S., Russian, and Ukrainian bilateral 
and trilateral negotiations finally led to a consensus on Ukrainian nuclear issues. The 
discussions of December 1993 resulted in the Trilateral Statement, signed in Moscow on 
January 14, 1994, by Presidents Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Leonid Kravchuk.89 
According to the Statement, the sides agreed that:90 
 Ukraine would follow its commitments to eliminate strategic nuclear 
weapons and to become a non-nuclear state acceding to the NPT as soon 
as possible; 
 Ukraine would receive security assurances from the United States and 
Russia from the moment its adhesion to START I and the NPT entered 
into force. In addition, the United Kingdom as a depositary state of the 
NPT would also provide security assurances to Ukraine; 
 Russia would compensate Ukraine for the cost of the HEU in the strategic 
warheads on Ukrainian territory, supplying an equivalent amount of LEU; 
 The United States would provide Nunn-Lugar assistance for dismantling 
the ICBMs, bombers, silos, and related nuclear infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the United States would ensure $175 million in financial aid 
according to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 
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In February 1994, Ukraine ratified START I and, in November 1994, acceded to the 
NPT, thus becoming a non-nuclear state.91 On December 5, 1994, during the Budapest 
summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ukraine’s newly 
elected President Leonid Kuchma passed to Clinton, Yeltsin, and British Prime Minister 
John Major Ukraine’s instrument of accession to the NPT.92 Finally, the four parties 
signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances that confirmed security 
assurances pledged by the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, thus finishing 
the complex negotiations and compromises.  
The remainder of this chapter examines in detail the factors that led to this 
outcome in the United States and Germany. It argues that while U.S. decisions regarding 
Ukraine were driven by its power relative to Ukraine during the first stage, in 1992–1993, 
and ideas and domestic politics during the second, Germany’s decisions resulted from the 
constant influence of its power position combined with a strong set of ideas, with 
domestic politics having a negligible impact. 
B. THE UNITED STATES AND UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
 The U.S. desire to see Ukraine as a non-nuclear state shaped the first years of 
U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral relations, resulting in political, economic, and diplomatic 
pressure on a newly independent state to complete the process of nuclear disarmament in 
the shortest period of time possible. In practice, this foreign policy decision regarding 
Ukraine was part of the broader U.S. strategy of accepting Russia as the only emerging 
nuclear power after the collapse of the Soviet Union.93 While maintaining its new global 
power position was the main cause of the U.S. position regarding the Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament, U.S. political ideas and values in the sphere of arms control and nuclear 
non-proliferation complemented the U.S. approach to nuclear-related issues both during 
the Cold War and after its end. Even though these ideas played an important role during 
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in the George H.W. Bush administration, they had a more powerful impact on the U.S. 
decision toward Ukraine’s nuclear weapons in the Clinton administration.  
1. U.S. Geostrategic Position and Security Interests  
 In late December 1991, the United States suddenly became the only global 
superpower. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and, respectively, the bipolar world, 
only the United States possessed sufficient strength in all categories of great power 
capability, thus enjoying “a preeminent role in international politics.”94 It immediately 
directed its efforts to ensure its hegemony and world leadership.95 This focus became 
clear when the New York Times published in 1992 a leaked Pentagon planning document 
demonstrating this U.S. preoccupation with unipolarity: 
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on 
the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat… 
Our strategy must now focus on precluding the emergence of any future 
global competitor.96  
Accordingly, the 1993 U.S. National Security Strategy defined the United States as “the 
preeminent world power with unique capabilities” and “the nation whose strength and 
leadership is essential to a stable and democratic world order.”97 Many decision makers 
in Washington believed that “neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an 
independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as a third force or a neutral bloc.”98  
As a key to its preeminence and national survival, the United States wanted to 
ensure that only newly independent Russia would retain the ability to destroy the United 
States with nuclear weapons and that strategic arms limitation would continue to erode 
that threat. This strategic capability would also ensure that the United States considered 
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Russian stability its primary concern in the former Soviet Union. The United States, in its 
1993 National Security Strategy, broadly defined the “limiting the proliferation of 
advanced military technology and weapons of mass destructions” as one of the national 
security interests in achieving global and regional stability.99 In addition, the Strategy 
determined that:  
In the post-Cold War era, one of our most threatening national security 
challenges is the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to 
deliver them. As the threat of nuclear confrontation with the former Soviet 
Union receded, the danger that a nuclear…weapon will be launched from 
some other quarter by an aggressor is growing… Inevitably, an increasing 
number of supplier nations will become able to contribute to the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.100   
This U.S. preoccupation with maintaining its position and national security through 
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament pushed the process of the nuclear disarmament 
and strategic weapons reductions in post-Soviet republics.  
Given their desire to maintain the U.S. unipolar position, U.S. foreign policy 
decision makers focused first on the nuclear negotiations with Russia and then on 
Ukraine as a subsidiary part of those negotiations. Ambassador Pifer emphasizes that the 
elimination of nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine  
…was seen as key to implementing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I) signed in July 1991 by President George H. W. Bush and then-
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, just months before the Soviet Union 
broke up, especially after Russia conditioned START I’s entry into force 
on Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine first acceding to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states…The desire 
to begin implementing START I reductions gave Washington an 
additional interest in seeing the question of nuclear weapons in Ukraine 
resolved as rapidly as possible.101  
Ambassador Popadiuk makes clear that Ukraine was aware of these U.S. 
concerns, writing that 
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There was also concern that Ukraine’s failure to fulfill its promises [to 
become a non-nuclear state] could unravel the whole START Treaty as 
well as endanger the START II, which was eventually signed with Russia 
in January 1993. Russia’s Parliament had stipulated that there would be no 
exchange of the instruments of ratification for a START I until the other 
nuclear republics acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. And 
START II would not come into force until START I had been successfully 
resolved. It was also feared that Ukraine’s reluctance could set a precedent 
for increased nuclear proliferation and could have jeopardized the NPT 
regime which was due for review in 1995.102 
During the first years of bilateral relations, it is clear that for reasons of national power 
and survival, U.S. foreign policy regarding Ukraine’s non-nuclear status became a 
subsidiary part of U.S.-Russian (Soviet) bilateral relations. After many years of the Cold 
War nuclear competition between the two superpowers, these states agreed to reduce 
their huge strategic nuclear arsenals.  
Even though the realist focus on national security interests dominated in U.S. 
decisions toward Ukraine in 1992–1993, the coervcive approach did not lead to the 
desired outcome in relations with Ukraine. During these years, the United States chose 
coercive tactics in relations with Ukraine to ensure that an additional nuclear power did 
not arise in Europe. Former Ambassador Popadiuk, confirming this U.S. approach toward 
Ukraine, emphasizes that, while  
…some European states favored Ukraine retaining its nuclear weapons, 
[but] the United States urged various European capitals to discuss the 
issue with Kiev and to tell Kiev it could not expect to receive economic 
assistance on the level Poland had until it moved on START and NPT.103   
2. U.S. Ideas: Nonproliferation and Arms Control 
After the Cold War, the Bush administration prioritized such broadly realist ideas 
as containment and perpetuating unipolarity.104 During late 1992 and early 1993, the 
Bush administration was preparing a “new NSC 68” [National Security Council Report 
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68] as a future guideline for the U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy.105 Where the original 
NSC 68 had set containment as the U.S. grand strategy for the Cold War, the new policy 
document declared that, “American grand strategy should actively attempt to mold the 
international environment by creating a secure world in which American interests are 
protected.”106 In this sense, the Bush administration focused on the ideas that reflected its 
realistic approach to foreign policy decisions. 
Nevertheless, narrower, nuclear weapons related ideas did not lose their 
importance. The Cold War nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet 
Union and its possible devastating consequences caused the formation of U.S. national 
ideas to reduce the nuclear threat worldwide. These included deeming the ideas of mutual 
nuclear arms limitation as a core stabilizing force and nuclear proliferation a key security 
threat, even though some prominent realist scholars argued that nuclear weapons 
proliferation would stabilize rather than destabilize international security.107 Preventing 
proliferation of nuclear weapons had been one of the highest foreign policy priorities for 
the United States since the 1960s and it included active measures not only regarding 
potential enemies such as North Korea or Iran, but also its allies, including South Korea, 
Italy, and West Germany.108  
In the 1993 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration affirmed previous 
ideas and priorities regarding the nuclear issue, and vowed to “continue its worldwide 
efforts to constrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”109 In addition, 
according to this strategy, the United States made the idea of nuclear disarmament in the 
former Soviet Union a key foreign policy priority.110 
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The the new Clinton administration’s U.S. National Security Strategy, issued in 
July 1994, demonstrates continuity in U.S. ideas and values regarding nuclear issues: 
A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and…their missile delivery systems. Countries’ weapons 
programs and their levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts 
will be among our most important criteria in judging the nature of our 
bilateral relations.111 
 
The sustained U.S. efforts and achievements in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation and 
arms reduction stem from a system of ideas and cultural values that governed U.S. 
nuclear strategy for most of its history, with the exception of the first Reagan 
administration. These ideas took on new life in the Clinton administration, largely thanks 
to a community of experts who changed the U.S. approach to Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament. 
a. Arms Control Epistemic Community 
The U.S. decision-making process can reflect the influence of epistemic 
communities as an important foreign policy input. Epistemic communities are “a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”112 
Historically, a U.S. epistemic community played a crucial role in creating a set of 
internationally accepted ideas and practices of nuclear arms control, which later 
contributed to the Cold War cooperation between the two superpowers.113 This group of 
experts significantly changed the approach to nuclear weapons, as they created a 
favorable intellectual climate for the idea of arms control by ensuring technical 
knowledge was available that provided the superpowers with reasons “why—despite all 
their ideological and political differences…—it was important that they cooperate.” 
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Additionally, the arms control epistemic community inspired the interest in arms control 
among government agencies and interest groups, and made the mass public aware of 
arms control. It promoted arms control legislation in Congress, and helped formulate 
specific rules and norms of arms control. Finally, members of the epistemic community 
became close partners with decision makers and directly influenced the formulation of 
policy.114 Thus, the U.S. arms control epistemic community was a key contributor to the 
peaceful nuclear cooperation between Cold War superpowers.  
The arms control epistemic community played a critical role in the U.S. foreign 
policy decision toward Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, one that became decisive only in 
the Clinton administration—at the second stage of disarmament negotiations. Prior to that 
time, the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, known as Nunn-Lugar, became 
the prominent example of U.S. arms control experts’ influence on governmental decision 
making. Exercising indirect influence through Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, 
arms control experts shaped the negotiation process regarding Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament. In addition to the Nunn-Lugar Act, Senators Nunn and Lugar visited 
Ukraine in 1992, promoting the ratification of START I and published a report 
reinforcing the U.S. approach toward the Ukrainian nuclear weapons.115 Later, the Nunn-
Lugar Act became an integral part of the 1993 Trilateral Statement, ensuring the financial 
assistance of $175 million to help Ukraine eliminate its nuclear weapons.116 
 The experts’ role in the Nunn-Lugar program began with a regular arms control 
study. In November 1991, a group of experts from the Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government studying nuclear arms 
control issues for many years published a detailed report, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control 
of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union.117 The group of experts 
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recommended that the U.S. government create a financial program of assistance for post-
Soviet republics, thus ensuring the safety of a huge nuclear arsenal.118  
While members of the Bush administration lacked interest in the experts’ ideas, 
Senators Nunn and Lugar, being concerned with military issues and nuclear danger, 
accepted the recommendations with enthusiasm.119 In addition, the initial group of 
experts joined with soon-to-be Defense Secretary Bill Perry and Carnegie Corporation 
President David Hamburg to create coherence between the ideas of the Harvard study and 
Senators Nunn’s and Lugar’s legislative implementation.120 
This cooperation provides direct evidence of the epistemic community’s influence 
on U.S. decision making. Ashton Carter and William Perry, in their book Preventive 
Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, describe the role and place of this 
community: 
On November 19, 1991, David Hamburg, president of the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, invited the two of us [Carter and Perry] and our 
colleague John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution to a meeting in 
Nunn’s office…Through the Carnegie Corporation of New York Hamburg 
and his associate, Jane Wales had for many years supported exchanges and 
discussions between Soviet and America scholars and officials…We were 
then both outside of government, Perry leading a research team at 
Stanford, and Carter a research team at Harvard, both studying national 
security problems…Carter briefed the senators on the Harvard study. It 
turned out that Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar and their staff members, 
Robert Bell, Ken Myers, and Richard Combs, were working on a similar 
scheme for joint actions. After the meeting broke up, Carter, Bell, Myers, 
and Combs stayed behind to draft what became known as the Nunn-Lugar 
legislation. 
In March 1992, after the legislation had gone into effect, we joined 
Senators Nunn, Lugar, Warner, and Jeff Bingaman, as well as David 
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Hamburg and staffers Bell, Myers, and Combs on a trip to look at the 
problem firsthand…visiting…Russia and Ukraine.121 
 As a result, the Nunn-Lugar program achieved its goal, contributing to the final 
denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. At the same time, Perry and 
Carter, as the leading representatives of the epistemic community, were able to put their 
ideas into practice. In 1993, they both landed positions in the Pentagon—Perry as Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (Secretary of Defense from February 1994) and Carter as Assistant 
Secretary of Defense in charge of the Nunn-Lugar Program.122 The Nunn-Lugar Program 
showed how policy experts and scholars ensured their long-standing influence on the 
U.S. government providing a talent bank for presidential administrations.123 The arms 
control epistemic community clearly played a significant role shaping the U.S. foreign 
policy decision about the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament. 
3. Domestic Politics 
Despite optimistic U.S. plans to complete the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament in 
the shortest period of time, in practice the process dragged out into a complex three-year-
long negotiation. The U.S. foreign policy choices regarding Ukrainian nuclear weapons 
was the outcome of interactions between key decision makers within the Bush and the 
Clinton administrations.  
a. The Bush Administration 
The top-level advisors of the Bush administration demonstrated that cohesive 
cooperation and the unity of worldviews did not always lead to the desired political 
outcomes. The lack of competition and bargaining among governmental officials caused 
a slow political response to the rapid changes taking place in 1991. Donald M. Snow and 
Eugene Brown explain that George H. W. Bush’s significant government experience, 
serving in Congress, as Ambassador to China, the head of the CIA, and Vice President, 
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led to the formation of a collegial team consisting of  James Baker, Secretary of State, a 
close Bush’s friend for 30 years; Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense and a former White 
House Chief of Staff and congressman from Wyoming; and Brent Scowcroft, the 
National Security Adviser, who previously held the position in the Ford administration 
and was admired for his scholarly grasp of international issues (with a Ph.D. in Russian 
history). Snow and Brown argue that a number of vital faults constrained their foreign 
policy decisions. Although the members of the collegial team “shared a worldview of 
pragmatic, moderate conservatism” and had excellent knowledge of Cold War 
international politics, “the world they knew was collapsing around them making them too 
often a half-step behind the march of history.” In 1991, Bush’s team aimed all its efforts 
on cooperation with Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, failing to perceive that “the future 
lay with Boris Yeltsin and other heads of a post-Soviet, noncommunist assortment of 
republics.” As decisions were made “within a closed circle comprised of Bush’s hand-
picked foreign policy-making team,” they became rather a reaction to events than an 
outcome of a wider vision of U.S. post-Cold War leadership. Long-lasting personal 
relations and identical worldviews among governmental actors excluded the principle of 
informal checks and balances, thus creating a national security bias. Finally, as the staff 
was ideologically very consistent with the president and his wishes, it could not promote 
new fresh ideas vital for the policy making process.124  
Pifer, describing how Bush’s political appointees, particularly James Baker, 
influenced U.S. foreign policy decisions on Ukrainian nuclear weapons, emphasizes that, 
“U.S. officials had begun thinking about the fate of Soviet nuclear weapons even before 
the Soviet Union finally collapsed in December 1991. Some in the Bush administration 
saw value in an independent Ukraine retaining nuclear arms. They believed a Ukrainian 
nuclear force could serve as a hedge to protect Kyiv’s sovereignty against a possibly 
resurgent Russia, and the fewer weapons in Moscow’s hands, the better.”  According to 
Pifer, 
Secretary of State James Baker took a sharply different view… Baker 
strongly believed it in America’s interest that only a single nuclear power 
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remain in the post-Soviet space. He saw no value to potential nuclear 
rivalries between Moscow and its neighbors. Baker thus argued for 
moving quickly and forcefully to ensure removal of all nuclear weapons 
from the post-Soviet republics outside of Russia, which would leave 
Russia as the sole nuclear power. [Pifer recalls that] while some in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and elsewhere did not share Baker’s 
view, no one in the U.S. government chose to challenge it. Baker made the 
issue of strategic nuclear forces a personal priority during his last months 
as secretary of state.125 
  President Bush shared Baker’s view that Ukrainian nuclear weapons should be 
viewed as just a subsidiary part of more important relations with Russia. On October 
1992, Bush in his letter to President Kravchuk clearly stated that Ukraine should ensure 
the transportation of nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling.126 In discussing the 
proposal of tying the nuclear issue to economic assistance for Ukraine, Scowcroft 
rejected the idea, and expressed confidence that Ukraine would cooperate on the nuclear 
issue anyway.127 Recalling the self-assuredness of this approach, Popadiuk concludes 
that despite Scowcroft’s certainty about Ukrainian submission to pressure, “the lame-
duck status of the Bush administration appeared to be working against any quick 
success.”128 The Bush administration’s one-sided focus on foreign policy regarding 
Russia that reduced Ukraine to a part of U.S.-Russian relations had no success in forcing 
newly independent Ukraine to abandon its nuclear weapons.  
b. The Clinton Administration 
 Unlike the Bush administration, the central decision makers of the Clinton 
administration were able to achieve Ukrainian nuclear disarmament after a significant 
change in approach. President Clinton’s perception of foreign policy priorities and 
reliance on other governmental decision makers with fresh ideas sparked flexible and 
creative political outcomes. On the one hand, as Clinton was the first president without 
military experience, he had no links to the national security system and its Cold War 
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legacies.129 In contrast to the collegial Bush team, Clinton’s administration key players 
did not know each other, which strengthened the role of the National Security Advisor as 
a mediator and helped prevent biased decisions.130 Talbott recalls that,  
Clinton saw strategic arms control as old business—unfinished, 
worthwhile, necessary, to be sure, but nonetheless not high on his agenda. 
He liked to refer to himself as ‘a tomorrow guy’… that meant letting 
others (like me) think about how many warheads the Russian Strategic 
Rocket Forces had aimed at the U.S. Unlike his predecessors from Truman 
to Reagan, Clinton didn’t have to get up every morning and worry about 
whether the leaders in Moscow were going to go to war against the 
West.131 
To ensure the effectiveness of the U.S. policy toward nuclear disarmament in post-Soviet 
republics, the Clinton administration created an Interagency Working Group within the 
National Security Council that included the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, 
Commerce, Central Intelligence Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office 
of Management and Budget, as well as the Office of Science and Technology Policy.132 
Consequently, a new method on foreign policy decision making allowed the members of 
the Clinton team to form a multidimensional approach to the Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament. 
Recognizing the mistakes of the previous administration, the Clinton team 
reevaluated and expanded the U.S. approach toward Ukraine. In April 1993, the U.S. 
government interagency review concluded that a new approach to Ukraine was 
needed.133 Pifer writes that,  
All interagency participants agreed on the importance of eliminating 
nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The main debate centered on whether to use 
more carrots or sticks and how to put this issue in the context of a broader 
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approach to Kyiv. The review concluded that the U.S. government should 
seek a broader relationship with Kyiv and engage on a range of political, 
economic, assistance and security issues, progress on which would be tied 
to progress on the nuclear question. Nuclear weapons remained the 
number one issue in Washington’s view.134 
As a result, Talbott visited Kyiv in May 1993 to initiate a new stage of U.S.-Ukrainian 
relations, broadening them from only nuclear issues to economic assistance, revamped 
political relations, and new military and defense ties.135 
 Talbott underlines the vital role of Bill Perry, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, a 
core member of the arms control epistemic community, who “had been the most powerful 
backer of Ukrainian denuclearization within the U.S. government and would bring the 
weight of the Pentagon to the talks, along with his own mastery of the subject.”136 Perry 
brought Ashton Carter into the Defense Department to run the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program. In addition, arms control experts Rose Gottemoeller at the NSC and 
Steve Pifer at the State Department were critical parts of the interagency team devising 
the new Ukrainian policy. With the participation of Perry, the United States and Ukraine 
achieved mutual understanding on complex issues, providing Ukraine “various forms of 
assistance from the United States as well as debt relief from Russia and international 
assurances on its sovereignty.”137 The contribution of a new policy making process that 
advanced the ideas of the arms control epistemic community led to the successful foreign 
policy outcome. 
The central decision makers of the Clinton administration shifted from the 
conservative Cold War thinking to a new multi-vector view on post-Soviet republics. 
Unlike the Bush administration, the new interagency team changed foreign policy efforts 
from the Russia-first policy to broader, independent relations with other post-Soviet 
republics. The U.S. approach regarding Ukraine included the desire to understand the 
identity of the newly independent state and use political and economic carrots instead of 
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pressure. Consequently, this approach finally led to the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine 
and allowed the states to turn the page in bilateral relations. 
In sum, in 1992–1994, the U.S. desire to resolve the issue of Ukraine’s nuclear 
weapons was elevated above all other decisions regarding the newly independent state 
and was one of the main priorities of the Bush and the Clinton administration. However, 
the United States won its diplomatic victory only in 1994, when the Clinton 
administration shifted from the Cold War thinking of Bush’s closest advisors, based on 
the maintaining the U.S. position as a superpower, to the multidimensional approach 
driven by ideas of the arms control community.  
C. GERMANY AND UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
In contrast to the United States, domestic politics played little role in the 
formation of German foreign policy decision regarding the Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament. Instead, Germany’s geostrategic position relative to Russia, as well as ideas 
shared by government and society were the main causes that ensured a German consistent 
approach to Ukraine’s nuclear weapons.  
Unlike the active U.S. political-diplomatic involvement, the role of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in achieving Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament was less central. 
However, in 1991, Germany clearly conditioned the further development of its bilateral 
relations with Ukraine on its nuclear disarmament and non-nuclear status. Being a non-
nuclear state, Germany could not propose security assurances as the United States or the 
United Kingdom did, but its relative economic power allowed Germany both to exert 
diplomatic pressure and to provide a set of economic to reduce the Ukrainian burden of 
nuclear arsenal elimination. 
1. German Geostrategic Position and Security Interests 
 The new geostrategic position and security interests of a reunified Germany 
impacted its foreign policy decisions regarding the countries of the former USSR. The 
1990 reunification of Germany and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union completely 
changed the security architecture of Europe. Reunified Germany was transformed into a 
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powerful European nation-state due to its geographic size, central location, economic 
strength, and population size, thus significantly influencing the development of the new 
Europe.138 Despite the skeptical predictions of the neo-realist school that Germany would 
quickly transform into a new regional hegemon and would seek nuclear status, the state 
demonstrated continuity in its foreign policy, maintaining its commitments to such 
multinational institutions as the EU and NATO.139  
Germany was then and remains a much weaker military power than the United 
States and Russia, and it took into account U.S. and Russian security interests in non-
nuclear Ukraine. The German position became even more uncertain with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991. Huge Soviet conventional forces on German soil 
were now technically controlled by Russia. There was no certainty about whether Soviet 
military personnel were still subordinated to the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev or 
to the Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Germany also had yet to conclude the Two Plus 
Four Agreement ending the World War II with the four occupying powers (the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union) and finally restore its 
sovereignty.  
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Germany focused on getting Soviet (then 
Russian) military personnel and equipment out of the former East Germany. Germany’s 
priority was to remove the “massive presence of Soviet conventional forces capable of 
launching a blitzkrieg attack in Central Europe.”140 To accomplish this, Germany 
recommitted to earlier pledges against the production of weapons of mass destruction, 
and the use of force in territorial disputes, as well as recognizing East German territory as 
a denuclearized zone within NATO.141 Germany, to realists’ surprise, opted for a soft-
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power approach using its economic and political power instead of the military.142 That 
soft-power position determined German foreign policy choices in the wake of the Soviet 
collapse, creating preferences for political-economic conflict prevention, a partnership-
oriented cooperative model, and democracy building.143  
Germany continued to recognize the United States as a world power and its main 
ally, and thus supported its foreign policy decisions regarding the Ukrainian nuclear 
weapons. David Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond emphasize that “from the German point 
of view, there was also a need in the post-Cold War world for an American presence 
farther east… In still-nuclear Ukraine, America’s leadership was indispensable.”144 On 
the other hand, the German perception of Russia as “the largest military power in Europe 
and, at the same time, global nuclear power”145 contributed to Germany elevating 
relations with Russia over relations with Ukraine. As Soviet conventional forces 
continued to be present on German soil until 1994, this material factor overshadowed 
alternative views on Ukraine.146 As a result of it its relative geostrategic position, 
German foreign policy choice regarding Ukrainian nuclear disarmament was 
subordinated to ensuring good bilateral relations with post-Soviet Russia. 
Another aspect of Germany’s geostrategic position, its geographic location, also 
played a role in formulating the German foreign policy decision regarding Ukrainian 
nuclear disarmament. The location of Germany in the center of Europe determined the 
state’s national interest in the stability of Eastern Europe.147 As the newly Central and 
Eastern European states were in transition from communism to democracy and 
experienced massive economic disruption, there was a significant concern that some of 
them could slide to anarchy or become a zone of a violent conflict similar to the former 
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Yugoslavia. In determining its main interests, Germany in its White Paper 1994 pointed 
out that 
In addition to the Euro-Atlantic ties, close cooperation with our eastern 
neighbors is also necessary to German security…Our relations with Russia 
and Ukraine play a crucial role. Russia is an especially important partner 
for lasting stability in Europe and the world. Because of its location at the 
center of Europe, Germany, more than any other state, is particularly 
interested in supporting its neighbors in the east on the road to democratic 
and market reforms.148 
Thus, any potential conflict between Russia and Ukraine could cause negative 
consequences for German stability after its unification.149 As Russia was still a major 
nuclear power in Europe, Germany as a non-nuclear state had an interest in retaining 
good relations with Russia. At the same time, the Germans viewed the Ukrainian nuclear 
arsenal as a source of a new potential environmental disaster similar to the Chornobyl 
accident that happened in Ukraine in 1986.150 Thus, it was in the German national 
interests to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine nuclear disputes 
and promote the further reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons in Russia and nuclear 
disarmament in Ukraine.  
2. German Ideas: A Civilian Power and a Special Russo-German 
Relationship
The historical lessons of two world wars had led to a set of ideas and values that 
formed a West German identity as a civilian and pacifist state. Thus, West Germany’s 
traditional ideas and cultural values became powerful inputs for unified Germany’s 
foreign policy decisions in the early 1990s. Hanns W. Maull, the German political 
scientist, describing Germany as a “civilian power,” emphasizes the domination of ideas 
of nonmilitary means and cooperation through multinational institutions to achieve 
foreign policy goals.151 Developing Maull’s concept, Sebastian Harnisch explains that 
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Germany prefers to use various strategies, including the strong system of collective 
security, non-violent resolution of disputes, and promotion of the rule of law.152 In 
support of this argument, Harnish points to Germany’s major contribution to the 
regulations in the sphere of arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and international criminal law.  
Franz-Josef Meiers believes that German civilian approach “is the result of 
socializing effects of international and collective identities of the Germans shaped by 
history and collective memory. Germany learned lessons from the past.”153 This culture 
of restraint affects the state’s identity and includes shared preferences within German 
society for multilateral cooperation, opposition to the use of military force, and antipathy 
to the state’s possible leadership in international security affairs.154 Furthermore, 
traditional ideas of multilateralism or anti-militarism usually inspire German politicians 
to make foreign policy decisions in accordance with them, and those decisions are likely 
to get domestic approval.155 In terms of foreign security decisions, Meiers concludes, 
“Germany prefers the role of a follower rather than agenda-setter.”156  
German decisions toward Ukraine and its nuclear weapons was a part of its efforts 
to civilize international relations. Through the reduction of offensive nuclear capabilities 
in Russia and Ukraine, the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation law, and the proposal 
of economic carrots for Ukraine, Germany demonstrated preferences for cooperation and 
peaceful dispute resolution. At the same time, it is likely that the pacifist identity and the 
antipathy to domination in security affairs determined German acceptance of a U.S. 
leading role in resolving the Russia-Ukraine nuclear dispute and U.S. foreign policy 
decisions regarding the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament.  
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The German foreign policy decision on Ukrainian non-nuclear status was also 
driven by the long-held idea of German nuclear pacifism and policy of nuclear non-
proliferation in the world. According to the German White Paper 1994:  
Germany advocates the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT, 
the accession of further states and the strengthening and widening of the 
possibilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency…The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…will be 
a priority task of security policy in the years ahead. Only if this task is 
accomplished will it be possible to guarantee that the transformation in 
international relations after the end of the East-West conflict does not lead 
to a phase of unpredictable global risks to security and stability.157 
This state policy reflects the ideas and goals of a powerful German anti-nuclear 
movement. Since the early 1970s, German anti-nuclear activists strongly opposed the 
nuclear industry, making a direct link between nuclear power and an atom bomb.158 This 
interest group continued to spread its non-nuclear ideology through the increasingly 
powerful Green Party, thus strengthening German national beliefs in life without nuclear 
energy.159 With these ideas prevalent in German politics and society, it is clear that 
Germany preferred to see Ukraine as a non-nuclear state and formulated its foreign policy 
decisions toward Ukraine accordingly. 
 Simultaneously, the German idea of friendship and cooperation with Russia also 
influenced German decisions toward Ukraine. For reasons related to the brutal conflict 
between Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II, Germany understood how 
much German unification worried the Soviet and post-Soviet leadership in Moscow. As a 
result, Germany stressed its desire to strengthen bilateral relations with Russia. 
According to the German White Paper 1994:  
The Joint Declaration of 21 November 1991 is a major step in the positive 
evolution of Russo-German relations. It states that the objectives are 
“relations in a spirit of friendship, good neighborliness, and cooperation.” 
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Good Russo-German relations are an important element of the future 
European system of security and stability.160 
In the early 1990s, the idea of peaceful and close relations with Russia often guided 
German foreign policy and affected Germany’s approach toward Ukraine as well.161 
Until 1994, the German government continued to formulate its relations with Ukraine 
through a Russian lens, focusing mostly on unresolved disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine.162 It is likely that the Germans perceived the issue of nuclear weapons on 
Ukrainian soil as one of those disputes. By using diplomatic pressure on Ukraine to 
abandon its nuclear weapons, Germany de facto added value to its relations with Russia 
as well as with the United States.  
3. Domestic Politics 
Neither competition among central decision makers nor organized interest groups 
were significant factors in the German decision on Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. German 
decision makers were united in their approach, and they produced a policy that satisfied 
German societal expectations and reflected widespread national beliefs in a non-nuclear 
world and a better security environment in Europe. 
a. Coalitional Politics 
There is little evidence that competition between key German decision makers 
shaped the German foreign policy decisions regarding Ukrainian nuclear disarmament.. 
In the early 1990s, the German government consisted of a coalition of the Christian 
Democratic Union/the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU) and Free 
Democratic Party (FDP).163 The Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), the Defense 
Minister Volker Ruhe (CDU), and the Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (and 
after 1992 Klaus Kinkel, both from FDP) shared the same ideas and values of nuclear 
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non-proliferation and disarmament. In addition, they believed in the idea of peaceful and 
close relations with Russia.164 Kohl would become the closest friend of Russian President 
Yeltsin in the West.165 Foreign Minister Genscher emphasized that the German-Russian 
(Soviet) relations presented the central pillar of stability of Europe.166 Thus, it is likely 
that German decisions regarding the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament were the outcome of 
a consensus between the main governmental players that shared the same anti-nuclear 
ideas and followed the Russia-first policy. As German decision makers viewed foreign 
relations with Russia as more important and beneficial than those with Ukraine, they 
formulated the approach to Ukraine after taking Russia’s interests into account.  
D. CONCLUSION 
 For both the United States and Germany the nuclear agenda was one of the top 
priorities in constructing the new security architecture of post-Cold War Europe. They 
conditioned the further development of bilateral relations with Ukraine on its 
commitments to abandon nuclear weapons and join the NPT. While the United States was 
directly and actively involved in the process of the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament and 
played the role of mediator in Russian-Ukrainian nuclear disputes, Germany played a 
supporting role, agreeing with U.S. and Russian policies regarding Ukraine’s nuclear 
weapons. Despite a number of complexities and misunderstandings, both states achieved 
their foreign policy goals of Ukrainian denuclearization after three years of negotiations.  
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III. THE 2008 BUCHAREST NATO SUMMIT 
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO.  Both nations have made valuable contributions to 
Alliance operations.  We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and 
Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in 
Georgia in May.  MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their 
direct way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support these 
countries’ applications for MAP.  Therefore, we will now begin a period 
of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the 
questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.167 
 
The events surrounding the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit demonstrated 
the emerging division among the NATO allies on the policy of enlargement to the East, 
in spite of their seeming agreement in the official declaration. Despite the intentions to 
extend the zone of stability and security in Europe, the NATO policy of enlargement has 
led to disagreements between allies and strengthened the risk of confrontation with 
Russia.168 During the Bucharest Summit, the continuous debate over the possible 
accession of Ukraine (as well as Georgia) to NATO revealed the lack of consensus 
between the European and North American allies, thus undermining long-standing Euro-
Atlantic unity.169 At the summit, the allies decided that they would not even accept the 
post-Soviet country’s application to begin the MAP. The allies’ ambivalent decision 
concerning the MAP for Ukraine demonstrated completely different U.S. and German 
approaches to Ukraine. In contrast to the case of the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, 
where Germany followed the U.S. lead, the Bucharest summit revealed German dissent. 
As the most prominent opponent of Ukrainian membership in NATO, Germany played a 
critical role in preventing the decision to begin a MAP for Ukraine.170 NATO’s 
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uncertainty concerning further enlargement to the East combined with dubious promises 
about Ukrainian membership at ‘some point in the future’ is argued to have undermined 
the prestige and credibility of the Alliance.171   
What explains the opposing U.S. and German foreign policy decisions concerning 
Ukraine at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit? Which factors influenced and constrained 
U.S. and German foreign policy options? The U.S. decision toward Ukraine was mainly 
driven by its ideas and domestic politics, leaving behind geostrategic position and 
security interests. The German decision, conversely, was primarily affected by its rising 
power status and national security interests, as well as domestic politics, which elevated 
the traditional impact of dominant German ideas.  
A. REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL EVENT 
The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit was an important event in the modern history 
of Ukraine. The summit marked the peak of NATO-Ukraine relations, bringing Ukraine 
closer to possible membership in the Alliance.172 On April 2–4, 2008, the allies 
discussed, among other challenges, the issue of the possible participation of Ukraine and 
Georgia to the MAP.173 In response to Ukraine’s January 2008 membership request, U.S. 
President George W. Bush unexpectedly proposed to its NATO allies to invite Ukraine to 
begin the MAP process at the April NATO Summit in Bucharest.174 This proposal caused 
a contentious debate, producing no consensus among the allies and a de facto negative 
decision on Ukrainian participation in MAP.175 Despite the “open door” policy of Article 
10, the disagreement over Ukraine called into question the credibility of the official 
statement to include Ukraine in future enlargements of the alliance and the allies’ own 
unity.  
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 It became clear in the aftermath of the Bucharest Summit that the United States 
and its European allies had different foreign policy approaches toward Ukraine and its 
future in NATO. Indeed, Germany and other key European NATO allies showed their 
reluctance regarding a MAP for Ukraine even before the Bucharest Summit.176 On March 
6, 2008, at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier stated, “I cannot hide my skepticism” about Ukraine’s prospects for a 
MAP.177 In addition, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner emphasized the 
importance of retaining good relations with Russia.178 Condoleezza Rice, then the U.S. 
Secretary of State, when describing the U.S. efforts to persuade the German side, 
remembers that, 
 [W]e intensified consultations with the Germans, trying to find a 
solution…At one point we thought we had an answer—a kind of enhanced 
cooperation that looked like the MAP but wasn’t called the MAP. 
Unfortunately, it satisfied no one. Since the Germans weren’t anxious to 
push the relationship with the aspirants [Ukraine and Georgia] too far 
beyond where it currently stood. Then we tried a tactic of fixing the end of 
the year as a deadline for making a final decision on the MAP. That didn’t 
satisfy anyone either. We left for Bucharest with no agreement in hand.179 
These controversial issues created a strong basis for the further contentious discussion 
between NATO allies at the Bucharest Summit.  
Germany and other Western European allies repeated their previous opposition to 
a MAP for Ukraine. George W. Bush in his memoirs Decision Points looked back: 
I was a strong supporter of [Ukraine’s and Georgia’s] applications. But 
approval required unanimity, and both Angela Merkel and Nicolas 
Sarkozy, the new president of France, were skeptical. They knew Georgia 
and Ukraine had tense relationships with Moscow, and they worried 
NATO could get drawn into a war with Russia.180  
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U.S. State Department officials also emphasized that Germany opposed the MAP for 
Ukraine and Georgia and expressed concern about provoking a negative reaction from 
Russia.181 Other Western European countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, 
supported the German view and argued that NATO should focus on existing military 
issues (such as the operation in Afghanistan) rather than a political discussion over 
further enlargement.182 Some of the allies believed that Ukraine did not meet alliance 
standards given domestic opposition to NATO, while other allied governments proposed 
instead that NATO should focus on European energy security issues, including a critical 
dependence on Russian energy resources.183 Indeed, several allied governments criticized 
the United States for its efforts to persuade them to find a consensus on Ukrainian MAP 
despite their previously expressed opposition and national security concerns.184 These 
points of controversy and friction left little chance for a consensus to emerge in Bucharest 
on the MAP for Ukraine. 
 At the event, the political discussion on the MAP for Ukraine and Georgia quickly 
turned into the main agenda of the summit, highlighting the clear absence of consensus. 
As a witness to those events, Rice described the official dinner with the foreign ministers 
as one of “the most pointed and contentious debates with our allies that I’d ever 
experienced … the most heated that I saw in my entire time as secretary.”185 While the 
German foreign minister Steinmeier expressed his concerns about “the weakness of the 
Ukrainian coalition” and “frozen conflicts” in Georgia, the Central European ministers 
immediately disagreed.186 First, they reminded Steinmeier of the history of West 
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Germany and its admission to the Alliance despite a divided Germany being “one big 
frozen conflict until 1990.”187 Then, according to Rice’s memoirs: 
The Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw “Radek” Sikorski, took the floor. 
Radek…was a fierce defender of the prerogatives of Central Europe…I sat 
back in my chair. “We’ve tried to be sensitive to German concerns in the 
EU,” Radek said. “You’re always saying, ‘Germany needs this and 
Germany needs that.’ Well, this is a matter of national security for us. And 
now you come and tell us you are more worried for Moscow than for your 
allies.”…Then, referencing the Munich appeasement of 1938 without 
saying the words, Radek reminded the German that Eastern Europe’s 
forty-year captivity under Soviet rule had been thanks to Berlin…Frank-
Walter was devastated. He would later say it was the most brutal 
experience of his time as foreign minister.188  
Using this psychological advantage, Rice tried to persuade Steinmeier, explaining that 
“[t]here are times when allies have to stand together…the MAP does not confer 
immediate membership…Moscow needs to know that the Cold War is over and Russia 
lost[, and] we can’t let it split the Alliance.”189 
The debate continued on the next day. Even though the allies decided to avoid the 
confrontation and postpone the MAP for Ukraine and Georgia, the Polish president at the 
start of the general session suddenly objected, “We want MAP now!”190 At this point, 
German Chancellor Merkel, in a discussion with Rice and East and Central European 
leaders that used Russian as the only common language, proposed the ultimate solution: 
“Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO.”191 Nevertheless, as the allies did 
not lay out a time frame for Ukraine, the decision suggested uncertain rather than firm 
prospects of NATO membership and continued division when Russian interests appeared 
at stake.  
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B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
 The United States was the main advocate of a MAP for Ukraine at the 2008 
Bucharest NATO Summit, a position that reflected its broader goal regarding NATO’s 
eastern enlargement: democracy promotion. Initially, the goal of democracy promotion 
was only a part of Bush’s Doctrine of neoconservatism, overshadowed by an extreme 
realism that advocated using American military power in the name of national 
interests.192 The consequences of the military intervention in Iraq, however, significantly 
weakened the U.S. emphasis on military preeminence causing, after 2006, the Bush 
administratrion’s primary focus on “a Wilsonian tradition of liberal internationalism and 
universalism.”193 Thereafter, the United States saw the policy of NATO enlargement as 
an integral part of its idealism. Consequently, the U.S. ideas and domestic politics drove 
its decision on Ukraine’s future in NATO rather than its geostrategic position.  
1. U.S. Ideas 
U.S ideas were the primary impetus for its foreign policy choice about Ukraine at 
the Bucharest summit. Ideas and values played a substantial role in U.S. foreign policy 
decisions in the 2000s. Over the period of 2002–2006 the idea of democracy promotion 
coexisted with the idea of a Pax Americana built on U.S. military primacy in the Bush 
administration’s neoconservative philosophy.194 This worldview emphasized that 
“military power provides the teeth.”195 In supporting the idea of the American primary, 
neoconservatives rejected a multilateral approach to foreign policy and advocated 
unilateral actions and extended use of military force.196 Simultaneously, 
neoconservatives still believed that “American foreign policy should actively, and at 
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times forcefully, work to spread democracy.”197 On the other hand, given the mess that 
would be created in Iraq, the the doctrine of preemptive use of force lost its influence on 
U.S. decision making after 2006. 
 Analyzing the consequences of the three-year war in Iraq, the second Bush 
administration began distancing itself from previous policies.198 On the one hand, the 
Bush administration continued an idealistic approach to achieving its national goals.199 
On the other hand, the Bush administration began “walking—indeed, sprinting—away 
from the legacy of its first term,” demonstrating a return to multilateralism and 
emphasizing the role of “transformational diplomacy.”200 The idea of democracy 
promotion not only survived this change, but became one of the dominant factors in U.S. 
foreign policy decisions. Since 2003, democratic values and the idea of worldwide 
promotion of democracy significantly shaped the Bush foreign policy agenda. “In 
November 2003, as the Georgian Rose Revolution was just getting underway, President 
George W. Bush spoke before the National Endowment for Democracy,” writes Mark 
Beissinger, “where he redefined (once again) the purpose of the American invasion of 
Iraq, calling it the beginning of a ‘global democratic revolution.’ Since then, we have 
seen active efforts by the United States and a number of American-based 
nongovernmental organizations … to support democratic revolutions within the post-
Soviet region and elsewhere.ˮ201 U.S. government funding democracy promotion in 
Ukraine increased after the 2004 “Orange Revolution,” following several years of 
decline.202 
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The Bush administration promoted democracy after 2006 as the most effective 
instrument of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, emphasizing the peaceful nature 
of democratic states and their ability to cooperate with international institutions.203 The 
2006 National Security Strategy emphasized the crucial importance of democracy 
promotion for the United States, stating that 
[b]ecause democracies are the most responsible members of the 
international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term 
measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional 
conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and 
extending peace and prosperity.204 
U.S. support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO reflected this ideational 
approach. 
Advocating and promoting the policy of NATO enlargement to the East, the 
United States sought to expand democracy in Europe. Explaining the U.S. decision 
regarding Ukraine at the Bucharest NATO Summit, Daniel P. Fata, Deputy Assistance 
Secretary of Defence for European and NATO Policy, stated: 
NATO enlargement continues to play a vital role in supporting the cause 
of freedom in Europe by promoting democratic values and giving 
countries a roadmap for military and political reforms. 
Ukraine[‘s]…aspirations to join the Alliance are closely connected to 
these same values as [it] seek[s] to solidify [its] democratic reforms and 
join the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies. We believe strongly that 
…Ukraine …deserve[s] to participate in a Membership Action Plan 
(MAP). This was the message the President and the Secretary of Defense 
took to Bucharest.205 
U.S. decisions about Ukraine were highly ideational in origin. In applying the idea of 
democracy promotion in Ukraine, the U.S. decision makers also promoted the idea of 
further democratization in Russia. In 2006, the Bush administration declared:  
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Stability and prosperity in Russia’s neighborhood will help deepen our 
relations with Russia, but that stability will remain elusive as long as this 
region is not governed by effective democracies. We will seek to persuade 
Russia’s government that democratic progress in Russia and its region 
benefits the peoples who live there and improves relationships with us, 
with other Western governments, and among themselves. Conversely, 
efforts to prevent democratic development at home and abroad will 
hamper the development of Russia’s relations with the United States. 
Europe, and its neighbors.206 
In response to Russia’s negative reaction to Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO, 
Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried expressed the official view that “democratic and 
peaceful countries on Russia’s borders are a threat to no one and make good neighbors 
for Russia, and for us all … thanks in part to NATO enlargement, Russia’s western 
frontiers have never been so secure and benign.”207 Thus, the dominant ideas of 
democracy promotion and NATO enlargement were powerful inputs for U.S. foreign 
policy decisions during the George W. Bush presidency. Nonetheless, the idea of NATO 
enlargement was not new and reflected the long-held ideas pushed forward by a U.S. 
epistemic community in the early 1990s. 
a. Epistemic Community and NATO Enlargement as Expanding Peace 
 A key reason that there was a little divergence in U.S. thinking about whether 
NATO should expand in 2008 was that opponents of the Alliance’s expansion had lost 
the debate in the 1990s when Clinton was president. The new Bush team believed that the 
United States could remake the world in its image as the unipolar power. It continued the 
ideas-based approach of the Clinton administration, adopting its “initial rationale for 
enlargement … on the notion that genuine peace could be constructed on the basis of 
shared democratic values. NATO’s political rather than military dimension stood at the 
center of the enlargement case.”208 This set of ideas of NATO enlargement was 
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originally promoted by an epistemic community of security experts, who advocated a 
new U.S. foreign policy agenda that stressed the link between democracies and peaceful 
stability in Europe. The 2008 U.S. decision concerning Ukraine’s future in NATO was a 
part of the long-standing U.S. strategy of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern 
Europe inspired by that group of experts in the early 1990s. Using direct and indirect 
channels in the U.S. administration and U.S. Congress, the community of experts 
dramatically shifted the U.S. approach to Central and Eastern Europe ensuring the green 
light for the NATO enlargement policy. Even though there is no explicit evidence of 
experts’ direct impact on the U.S. decision about a MAP for Ukraine, this epistemic 
community formulated the ideological base that became U.S. policy in the 1990s, and 
which formed the basis for the 2008 decision. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the RAND Corporation, a U.S.-
government funded think tank, proposed a significant shift in the U.S. approach toward 
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Russia.209 Ronald D. Asmus and several of his 
colleagues at RAND believed that “the U.S. should enlarge NATO as the natural 
extension of the American commitment to democracy and integration in Europe.”210 
They sought NATO enlargement as a vital instrument of Central and Eastern Europe’s 
stability and the Alliance’s survival.211 To promote the new policy, Asmus first used his 
close relationship with Senator Richard G. Lugar, inspiring Lugar to give a public speech 
on NATO enlargement.212 Senator Lugar became the second Western politician, after 
German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, who publicly advocated for NATO enlargement 
as a basis of a new European security architecture.213 Then in September 1993, three 
RAND experts—Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee—published in 
Foreign Affairs an article that, Asmus believes, “became a cause célèbre in policy 
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making and diplomatic circles.”214 Arguing for the enlargement, their article “Building a 
New NATO,” proposed several core ideas of further NATO development:215 
 NATO should shift from collective defense priority to a broader strategy 
based on democracy promotion, stability, and crisis management. 
 It is in the U.S. interests to promote the “Europeanization” of the alliance. 
 Despite the West’s “fear of offending Russia’s strategic sensibilities,” 
democracy indeed ensures stability and prevents instability and potential 
conflict in Russia’s neighborhood. 
 The Alliance’s expansion to the East is “a step toward Russia, rather than 
against it.” 
 Ukraine is an important guarantee against Russian imperial ambitions and 
a strategic buffer between Europe and Russia.  
 The West should promote the European future of Ukraine. 
Although the article did not promote the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO 
directly, it played a core function in the enlargement strategy. These ideas were made 
manifest in the 2008 U.S. decision regarding a MAP for Ukraine. 
 RAND experts, however, did not stop the publication of the scholarly article. 
They promoted their new NATO policy by seeking direct positions and contacts in the 
U.S. administration. At first, senior officials from Pentagon and State Department 
perceived RAND briefings on enlargement with opposition and skepticism. In addition, 
reacting to Lugar’s speech, the Department of State circulated Secretary Warren 
Christopher’s remarks urging members of the administration to avoid any debate on 
enlargement.216 Nevertheless, there were some important proponents of enlargement, 
including Clinton’s National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Chief-of-staff at the State 
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Department Tom Donilon.217 Asmus describes how the epistemic community’s policy 
promotion proceeded, writing that, 
Donilon read Lugar’s speech and had received an advance copy of our 
RAND article from Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis. Davis was an old 
NATO hand from previous stints in government and think tanks. As a 
RAND Vice President, she had directed some of RAND’s early work on 
NATO enlargement… She was one of Secretary Christopher’s confidants. 
Along with Steve Flanagan and Hans Binnendyk, from the Policy 
Planning staff, she became the voice in Christopher’s immediate entourage 
making the intellectual case for NATO enlargement.218 
Later, in November 1996, the new Secretary of State Madeleine Albright invited Asmus 
to work in the Clinton administration as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the State 
Department’s European Bureau, seeking to develop the policy of NATO enlargement, as 
well as relations with the Russians and the Baltic States.219 Using the direct and indirect 
influence on the policy making process, the epistemic community shifted the U.S. post-
Cold War vision of Europe toward NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Once inspired by these experts, Senator Lugar continued to promote further 
expansion of NATO to the East even though his longtime Senate ally, Sam Nunn 
opposed NATO expansion. On February 6, 2007, Lugar introduced the NATO Freedom 
Consolidation Act that, after passing the Senate and the House, was signed into law by 
President Bush on April 9.220 Later in January 2008, Senator Lugar successfully 
introduced a resolution expressing U.S. Senate support for Ukraine and Georgia to 
participate in NATO’s MAP “as soon as possible.”221 The U.S. Congress’s decisions 
point to the impact of the epistemic community on foreign policy issues. Their core 
principles of NATO enlargement are visible in the U.S. position on Ukraine at the 
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Bucharest NATO Summit. and its insistence a final declaration suggesting a MAP for 
Ukraine by the end of 2008. Relying on the ideas of this epistemic community, U.S. 
politicians sought to persuade its NATO allies and Russia to accept the U.S. position 
toward Ukraine.  
2. Domestic Politics 
U.S. domestic politics played a complementary role strengthening the primary 
influence of ideas on the U.S. decision on Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Before 2006, 
the heretofore collegial Bush team became divided between those with hawkish 
sympathies and those more cautious about the use of force. By 2006, given the 
consequences of the Iraq war, many of the hawks in the Bush team lost their influence on 
central decision making. The second Bush team rejected the dominance of unilateralism, 
the policy of preemptive war, and use of American forces to promote democracy. Instead, 
it focused again on multilateralism and promotion of “realistic Wilsonianism.”222  
From the beginning of the Bush presidency, key members of the Bush’s foreign 
policy team, including National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, Deputy National 
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, were main 
proponents of enlargement. During the Clinton years, these three were a part of the 
conservative “U.S. Committee on NATO, a nonprofit organization formed in 1996 to 
support enlargement at a time when Senate ratification was in doubt.”223 Yet, as Rebecca 
Moore notes, 
Even more significant was Bush’s appointment of Daniel Fried to his 
National Security Council staff as Director for European and Eurasian 
Affairs. As a member of Bill Clinton’s National Security Council staff and 
then U.S. Ambassador to Poland from 1997 until 2000, Fried had been a 
strong proponent of NATO enlargement. Bush’s decision to appoint him 
to a key position within his own administration might be construed as 
evidence that the President was, from the beginning, at least somewhat 
sympathetic to the enlargement process.224  
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Indeed, with time Bush turned from just a sympathetic to a strong believer in the success 
of further NATO enlargement to the East. 
In formulating the U.S. position on Ukraine’s future in NATO, the key policy 
makers demonstrated cohesive cooperation, similar to the collegial team of George H.W. 
Bush. The political outcome regarding Ukraine mainly resulted from a coalition between 
President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Rice, like Gates, had the same expertise 
in Russian (Soviet) studies and had successfully worked in the George H.W. 
administration on the issues surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union.225 Working 
together with Rice in the George W. Bush team, Gates admitted to “a strong working 
relationship that radiated throughout our respective bureaucracies” that produced  
agreement on most issues, including Ukraine.226  
While there was strong support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO on the 
National Security Council, Bush himself was a strong believer in NATO and made the 
enlargement of the Alliance a personal priority.227 Despite Western European concerns 
about Russia’s interests, Bush truly believed that extending a MAP to Ukraine would 
reduce the threat of Russian aggressive action.228 Even though Rice and Gates remained 
uncertain about whether they would succeed in Bucharest, they supported the president’s 
choice. Gates remembered how he “dutifully supported the effort to bring Georgia and 
Ukraine into NATO (with few pangs of conscience because by 2007 it was clear the 
French and Germans would not allow it).”229 Describing the how the the decision on 
Ukrain came to be made, Rice emphasized that, 
We faced a dilemma. At the NSC meeting held to consider our position, I 
presented the pros and cons with no recommendation. Frankly, I didn’t 
know what to do. Though the status was not the same as membership in 
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NATO, everyone knew that no MAP country had ever failed to gain 
membership… The President listened to the arguments and then came 
down on the side of Ukraine and Georgia. ‘If these two democratic states 
want MAP, I can’t say no,” he said toward the end of the meeting. I 
admired his principal stand… But I have to deliver this, I thought. This is 
going to be really hard.230  
Consequently, even though members of the team remained uncertain about the success of 
the decision, President Bush took the lead, reaffirming his commitment to NATO Eastern 
enlargement. Bush continued to believe that, “no nation should be used as a pawn in the 
agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of free European people. No more 
Munichs. No more Yaltas.”231 . 
3. U.S. Geostrategic Position and Security Interests 
Even though the U.S. global geostrategic position played an important role in the 
foreign policy decisions of the Bush administration in general, these factors had only an 
indirect influence on the decision regarding Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The Bush 
administration used its enormous military power to resolve global challenges, such as a 
war against international terrorism, and to preserve its primacy. With the election of 
George W. Bush, “the ideology of American global preeminence” came to power.232 
Although the more realist members of the Bush team were somewhat more cautious 
about the use of military force to reshape international politics, the more neoconservative 
members lobbied for the notion that “the United States is now the sole superpower in the 
world and seeks to preserve its hegemonic position for the indefinite future; American 
omnipotence and leadership [is] a prerequisite for an orderly and peaceful world.”233 
President Bush, in a speech at West Point in June 2002, said that “America has, and 
intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.”234  
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The Bush administration truly believed in its unipolar position but in acting 
unilaterally and without restraint, it rejected the arguments of various realist scholars 
about how to sustain American primacy.235 This habit led to a major division within 
NATO over the Iraq war, with Germany and other key European allies (except the United 
Kingdom) opposing the military intervention. Much of the Europeans’ criticism of the 
U.S. intervention in Iraq was that, in relying only on its superpower status, the United 
States “had not made an adequate case for invading Iraq in the first place and did not 
know what it was doing in trying to democratize Iraq.”236 Explaining the effect of this 
U.S. approach, Fukuyama concludes that, “the global reaction to the Iraq war … 
succeeded in uniting much of the world in a frenzy of anti-Americanism.237 The primary 
focus of the Bush administration on U.S. superpower status in foreign policy decision 
making provoked opposition among key NATO allies and rising anti-Americanism.  
As noted previously, the 2006 National Security Strategy reflected a change in 
foreign policy. The state continued declaring its “enormous power and influence” to deal 
with global challenges and determined that “America must lead by deed as well as by 
example.”238 Nevertheless the new National Security Strategy toned down the unilateral 
use of force, stating that U.S. strength “rests on strong alliances, friendship, and 
international institutions, which enables us to promote freedom, prosperity, and peace in 
common purpose with others.”239 Hence, the second Bush team prioritized ideas as one 
of the main instruments of foreign policy. This updated approach to foreign policy 
decisions led the second Bush team to revitalize the policy of democracy promotion and 
NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe. Before arriving at this ideological position, U.S. 
core security interests defined its primary focus on the cooperation with the world’s great 
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powers, including Russia, rather than Ukraine, particularly in the global war on terror.240 
During the first years of Bush presidency, the U.S. foreign policy decisions were driven 
by its core national security interests in fighting terrorism and led to the extended 
strategic cooperation with former adversaries. In his second inaugural address, Bush 
highlighted instead the importance of ideas. He declared that “America’s vital interests 
and our deepest beliefs are now one.”241 Neoconservatives in the Bush team underscored 
a liberal theory of international relations.242 Realist scholars argue that this ideas-driven 
approach “led to so many of the United States’ foreign policy blunders.”243 
Neoconservative preeminence and ideology superseded concerns for U.S. geostrategic 
position in formulating U.S. foreign policy decisions during the second term, including 
decisions on Russia and Ukraine.  
C. THE ROLE OF GERMANY 
 In contrast to the United States, Germany’s foreign policy decision regarding 
Ukraine was primarily affected by its rising power status and domestic politics, which in 
this case were more important than ideas. During the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, 
Germany became the main opponent of further enlargement of the Alliance to Ukraine. 
Despite U.S. efforts to find a consensus with Western Europe, Germany took the leading 
role in preventing the extension of the MAP to Ukraine. In expressing its divergent 
approach to Ukrainian accession to NATO, Germany confirmed its status as a major 
European power that calculated its own interests and priorities rather than followed U.S. 
leadership.   
1. Germany’s Geostrategic Position and National Interests 
 The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit demonstrated that geopolitical status was the 
most powerful determinant of Germany’s skeptical view of Ukrainian membership in 
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NATO. Globally Germany has a weaker geostrategic position compared to the United 
States and Russia due to its non-nuclear status and limited military capabilities. In 
addition, Germany’s geographical proximity to Russia heightens its concerns regarding 
Russian revisionist ambitions and possible aggressive reaction to further NATO 
enlargement to the East. The long history of Russian-German relations has formed the 
German perception that 1) Russia is the big neighbor; 2) “a resource-rich and technology-
poor Russia complements the resource-poor, technology-rich Germany”; and 3) Russia 
remains dangerous due to its history of unreliable cooperation and destruction.244 The 
German White Paper 2006 confirms the continuity of the Russia-first approach that was 
evident in the denuclearization case,   
Russia takes a special place in…bilateral cooperation, this being due to the 
formative experience in the course of our common history and that 
country’s special role as a prominent partner of NATO and the European 
Union, its size and potential. Russia is one of the G8 nations, a nuclear 
power, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council…Russia is an important energy supplier and economic partner. 
Without Russia, security, stability, integration, and prosperity in Europe 
cannot, therefore, be guaranteed. It is in Germany’s special interest that 
Russia’s modernization is supported by intensified political, economic and 
cultural cooperation.245 
Following from this, Germany recognizes Russia as a regional great power that may 
possess a threat to its security and further economic development. When explaining 
Germany’s skeptical response to further NATO enlargement to Ukraine, U.S. President 
Bush stated that Germany as well as France “worried NATO could get drawn into war 
with Russia.”246 German Foreign Minister Steinmeier did not hide his concerns regarding 
Russia’s negative reaction to Ukrainian membership.247 Consequently, Germany’s power 
status significantly influenced its decision on Ukraine. Even though its growing national 
power allows Germany to make independent foreign policy choices, its weaker 
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geostrategic position compared to Russia in this case led to the calculation of a possible 
aggressive reaction from the latter. 
Since reunification, Germany has significantly developed its economic 
capabilities and transformed itself into the EU’s “embedded hegemon.”248 Germany’s 
economic position has given it more confidence to conduct an independent foreign policy 
than in 1992–1994. Its rising national power, according to Beverly Crawford, inspires 
Germany to preserve its independence and freedom of actions and to have its national 
interests shape European institutions, not the other way around.249 According to 
Crawford, the status of regional embedded hegemony means that Germany “has led by 
shaping new institutions in Europe, and, more importantly, it has been Europe’s ‘patron,’ 
in that it has taken on a disproportionate share of the regional burden of institutional 
cooperation. Its leadership is thus ‘embedded’ in those institutions.”250 Germany’s 
leadership is, however, highly dependent on the strength of these institutions and their 
impact on German power and economy, as well as on the general state of Germany’s 
economy.251  
Stephen Szabo agrees that economic interests are the most powerful foreign 
policy inputs and that they supersede the influence of ideas. Germany continues to 
perceive multilateralism as one of its national interests to collectively prevent emerging 
security challenges and threats.252 Germany’s transformation into a trading state, 
however, has led to the dominance of a geo-economic approach to foreign policy, in 
which business takes precedence over values such as human rights and democracy 
promotion, and economic performance determines German preferences in relations with 
other countries.253 According to Szabo, Germany “cedes overall grand strategy to 
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business interests, especially those associated with the export market and natural 
resources, and reduces the role of political and administrative leaders… The symbiosis 
between business and politics is deepened in those cases in which German business has to 
deal with state-dominated economies, most notably in China, Russia, and the Middle 
East.”254  
The preceding suggests that economic stability and energy security are vital 
national interests for Germany. Russia’s status as the primary supplier of gas to Europe 
challenges such stability and security. In 2006 Russia cut off gas in the aftermath of the 
2004 pro-democracy Orange Revolution in order to use Ukraine’s gas dependence to 
restore its dominance in the country. This first “energy war” with Ukraine promoted 
Germany and other EU states to perceive a significant threat from Russia, which only a 
few years ago had been considered a reliable energy partner.255 It is in German national 
interests to prevent new energy risks for the European Union and Germany’s economy 
and ensure the stability of German-Russian relations. Consequently, these concerns are 
reflected in the 2006 German White Paper, released in October that year, 
A secure, sustained and competitive supply of energy is of strategic 
importance for the future of Germany and Europe…Germany’s and 
Europe’s growing dependence on imported energy resources calls for an 
intensification of the dialogue and cooperation between producer, transit 
and consumer countries, including trade and industry.256 
In 2008, the German economy remained highly dependent on energy resources exported 
mainly from Russia. As Russia supplied around 40 percent of its natural gas and 30 
percent of crude oil in 2007, Germany likely put a high priority on good relations with 
the Russians.257 In opposing a MAP for Ukraine, Germany likely sought to protect its 
national interests and thus considered its bilateral relations with Russia as more vital than 
those with Ukraine. 
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2. Domestic Politics 
German domestic politics played an important role in its foreign policy decision 
regarding Ukraine. Both parliamentary politics and organized interest groups 
complemented Germany’s shift to commercial realpolitik258 and thus contributed to the 
state’s skeptical foreign policy decision toward Ukraine’s membership in NATO. 
a. Coalitional Politics  
 The German decision regarding Ukraine was the result of the bargaining between 
German high-ranking officials with different interests and ideological priorities. The 
German debate on the MAP for Ukraine reveals the existence of pro-Western and pro-
Russian views in German foreign policy. From 2005 to 2009, Germany was governed by 
the Christian Democratic-Social Democratic grand coalition; this created “dualism” 
between the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel of the CDU and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).259 Szabo points 
out that “there was always a certain tension and rivalry between two bureaucracies during 
this period, heightened by the fact that both parties were practically equal in their 
parliamentary representation and were temporary partners.”260 The competition between 
the two leaders became obvious in the process of formulating Eastern European and 
Russia policy.261 While Merkel expressed skepticism about the idea of cooperation with 
Russia, Steinmeier acted as the main advocate of the Russia-first policy.262 In addition, 
Steinmeier openly opposed Merkel’s approach toward Russia and her efforts to isolate 
this eastern neighbor.263 Before Merkel became chancellor, Steinmeier had served as the 
head of the Chancellor’s Office for Gerhard Schröder, leader of the SPD. There he 
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became the major architect of the policy “Modernization through Interdependence” in 
dealing with Russia.264 Even though Schröder with his pro-Russian policy lost the 
elections to the Bundestag in 2005, his former right hand, Steinmeier, continued 
promoting the special approach toward Russia as foreign minister in the new Merkel 
government.265 Steinmeier and Schröder reflected the political views of their SPD, which 
had always preferred closer relations with Russia, neutrality, and distancing from the 
United States.266 Forsberg emphasized that “Steinmeier was known to be Schröder’s 
trusted man and a staunch supporter of a cooperative Ostpolitik.”267 Hence, the Russia 
policy became the subject of political debates within German government.  
It can be argued that it was Frank-Walter Steinmeier who persuaded Chancellor 
Merkel to oppose the U.S. initiative on Ukraine at the Bucharest NATO Summit. First, 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier openly expressed his skepticism about the MAP for Ukraine 
at official meetings before and during the Bucharest Summit.268 Steinmeier emphasized 
the risk of the decision for the stability of relations with Russia. He suggested that 
accepting the U.S. initiative on Ukraine, Germany could undermine the special German-
Russian relations developed by Steinmeier and Schröder in previous years. Holding a 
strong position in the grand coalition that formed Merkel’s first government, Steinmeier 
probably did not leave Merkel other options than pushing forward the decision to 
postpone indefinitely the MAP for Ukraine. In fact, the German decision regarding 
Ukraine reflected the influence of Steinmeier’s pro-Russian foreign policy.  
b. Organized Interest Groups 
Interest group politics played an indirect role in shaping the German decision 
regarding Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit, largely through their support for a pro-
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Russian foreign policy. High economic stakes conditioned the emergence of the powerful 
business lobby that focused mainly on the promotion of reliable German-Russian 
economic relations. In the first half of 2008, the trade between the two countries rose to 
$50 billion, including $36 billion in German exports to Russia.269 More than 4,600 
German companies invested around $13.2 billion in the Russian economy, making 
Germany’s position that of the world’s largest exporter to Russia.270 In addition, energy 
issues raised the economic stakes, as in 2008 Russia remained the main energy partner of 
Germany, providing about 37 percent of its natural gas supply and 32 percent of its oil.271 
Thus, it was in several business lobbies’ interest to support and strengthen the pro-
Russian direction of German foreign policy. 
 According to Szabo, German business is the most powerful driver of Germany’s 
special approach toward Russia.272 It was the German private sector that transformed 
Germany into one of the most successful economies in the world.273 German companies, 
according to Szabo, therefore felt they had a moral right to extend their influence to 
German foreign relations. As German-Russian economic relations presented a large share 
of the German economy, a significant number of German companies sought to influence 
the state’s foreign policy to ensure the stability of relations with Russia. German 
manufacturing and energy companies took the lead in creating various bilateral 
institutions and working groups.274 For instance, a German-Russian Working Group for 
Strategic Questions of German-Russian Economic and Financial Relations (SAG) was 
created to link politics and business and provide “impulses for joint pilot projects.”275  
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 In addition, there were special lobbying organizations with long traditions of 
promoting Russian-German relations. Szabo points out that the German Committee on 
Eastern European Economic Relations (The Ost-Auschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 
(OA), founded in 1952, focused on support of German companies investing in the 
Russian economy and acted as a mediator between German business and policy 
makers.276 Szabo emphasizes that the Committee “has been extremely successful and 
influential when it comes to lobbying the German government on its policy concerning 
the East, most importantly Russia.”277 Indeed, the Committee has around 200 member 
companies and is supported by five main German industry associations: the Federation of 
German Industries (BDI), the Association of German Banks (BdB), the German 
Insurance Association (GDV), the Foreign Trade Association of German Retailers 
(AVE), and the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH).278 Thus, according to 
Szabo, the OA played a key role in strengthening the pro-Russian direction of German 
foreign policy. 
In addition, the German-Russian Forum also had an impact on the development of 
pro-Russian policy. The Forum is a nonprofit organization founded in 1993 to promote 
the cooperation between Germany and Russia, and it is best known for the co-
organization of the Petersburg Dialogue.279 It consists of 300 members, including 
representatives of the Germany’s largest companies, politicians, think tanks, journalists, 
and academics.280 The Petersburg Dialogue, established in 2001, provides the basis for 
bilateral economic working groups and annual meetings of high-ranking members of 
business and governments.281 The Petersburg Dialogue focuses on a “business über 
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alles” (business above all) tone, which avoids discussing such Russian political issues as 
human rights or democratic regression.282  
There is also evidence that in 2008 the German-Russian Forum had the 
opportunity to influence German foreign policy decision making. As Szabo points out, 
The Forum’s Chairman since 2003 has been Ernst-Jorg von Studnitz, a 
former German ambassador to Russia. Its Kuratorium include[d] Eckhard 
Cordes and Klaus Mangold, Gernot Erler of the SPD, Manfred Stolpe and 
Lothar de Maziere, former leaders in eastern Germany after unification 
and Hans Joachim Gorning, a managing director of Gazprom Germania 
and someone suspected of former ties with the Stasi.283  
Thus, as some of the members of the Forum were either the representatives of the SPD or 
former officials of the Schröder government, there were reasonable grounds to assume 
that they probably had some impact on the pro-Russian policy of the Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier.  
 Nevertheless, it is likely that the Russian energy giant Gazprom has had the most 
powerful impact on the development of the Russian-German special relations. Szabo 
emphasizes that “Gazprom is not a normal multinational energy company … [but] rather 
an organization that serves the interests and the agenda of the Russian state.”284 Indeed, 
Gazprom through its subsidiary company Gazprom Germania has significant shares in 
various German companies, controlling 38 percent of the German gas market.285 In 
addition, Gazprom owns 51 percent of the Nord Stream Pipeline, while others holders are 
E.ON and BASF, each with 15 percent.286 Russian Gazprom is a reliable agent for 
promoting Russian interests in Germany. 
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Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s case may be seen as the most obvious 
example of Gazprom’s influence on German politics.287 In fact, Gazprom directly 
lobbied its interests during and after the German government under Schröder. Two weeks 
before he left office, Schröder approved the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline for 
a staggering $6 billion. Shortly after leaving office, he accepted the position of chairman 
of the supervisory committee of the North European Gas Pipeline Company (NEGPC), 
responsible for the building of the Nord Stream pipeline.288 These facts caused outrage in 
Germany and abroad. According to Spiegel, both Schröder’s political friends and 
opponents were equally stunned.289 Merkel’s Christian Democrats called on Schröder to 
resign, asserting that “he has done grave damage to Germany’s reputation. Unless he 
quits, his job will look like a reward for his efforts [as chancellor].”290 In addition, The 
U.S. Washington Post wrote: 
The chancellor of Germany—one of the world’s largest economies—
leaves his job and goes to work for a company controlled by the Russian 
government that is helping to build a Baltic Sea gas pipeline that he 
championed while in office. To make the decision even more unpalatable, 
it turns out that the chief executive of the pipeline consortium is none 
other than a former East German secret police officer who was friendly 
with Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, back when Mr. Putin was a 
KGB agent in East Germany. If nothing else, Mr. Schroeder deserves 
opprobrium for his bad taste.291 
These events around Schröder suggest the power of Russian interests in German decision 
making.  
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The analysis of German interest group politics demonstrates that various groups 
with pro-Russian interests are deeply involved in German domestic politics and have a 
powerful influence on Germany’s decision making. There are significant reasons to 
believe that the aforementioned business lobbies influenced German foreign policy 
making in 2008. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that they directly pushed forward 
the German decision on Ukraine at the Bucharest NATO Summit though it is likely they 
supported Steinmeier’s pro-Russian stance. 
3. German Ideas 
Long-standing ideas regarding Germany as a “civilian power,” discussed in the 
previous chapter, failed to influence the German decision regarding Ukraine at the 
Bucharest Summit. National economic interests collided with ideas and values that 
underpinned the civilian state approach to foreign policy. Throughout the 1990s, this 
approach was still dominant, as Germany together with the United States were the 
primary champions of NATO enlargement.292 One might expect these ideas and values to 
be drive Germany to support Ukrainian membership in NATO in 2008. Yet, the decision 
to reject a MAP for Ukraine in April 2008 reinforces Szabo’s argument that Germany 
now engages in “selective multilateralism,” based on its economic interests.  
Even while Germany in 2008 remained officially committed to the civilian power 
ideas of multilateralism, international law, and democracy promotion, its behavior 
suggests a different set of preferences.293 In addition, officially, the German government 
asserted in 2006 that “the transatlantic partnership remains the bedrock of common 
security for Germany and Europe. … NATO is committed to safeguarding the principles 
of democracy, freedom and the rule of law and lays the foundation for collective 
defense.294 Hanns W. Maull has pointed out that “the tensions, even contradictions, 
between [German] traditional ‘grand strategy’—or foreign policy role concept as a 
‘civilian power’—and a Germany, a Europe, a world of international relations so 
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radically different from what they had been before 1990 have become increasingly 
apparent.”295  
Germany’s rejection of a MAP for Ukraine demonstrates its shift from an 
ideational to a geo-economic approach to foreign relations. Paul Belkin believes that 
“Germany has consistently sought to ensure that Russia does not feel threatened by EU 
and NATO enlargement.”296 In Szabo’s view, special German-Russian relations 
combined the legacy of Ostpolitik to create this new German geo-economic strategy. The 
idea of special relations with Russia became an extension of the German Ostpolitik 
founded in the late 1960s.297 Germans believed that the Ostpolitik strategy of détente and 
engagement with the Russians allowed Germany to reunify peacefully.298 The significant 
focus on special relations with Russia was the primary determinant of the German 
approach to Ukraine. Traditional German ideas and values ceded to its new national 
interests. German geo-economic approach and special German-Russian relations 
surpassed ideas of democracy promotion and NATO enlargement to cause Germany’s 
vote against Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit was remarkable for the public disagreement 
between allies on the policy of NATO enlargement to the East. While the United States 
became the main advocate of the MAP for Ukraine, Germany played the opposite role 
and prevented further NATO extension to Ukraine. Divergent U.S. and German 
approaches to Ukraine were primarily caused by the collision of American idealism and 
German geo-economic pragmatism. While U.S. ideas and domestic politics pushed 
forward the decision on Ukraine’s membership in NATO, Germany’s rising power status 
and national interests, supported by domestic politics, prevented a favorable decision for 
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Ukraine. Hence, power status and national interests, ideas, and domestic politics had a 
different impact on U.S. and German decisions regarding Ukraine. 
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IV. THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT  
The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in 2014 marked the 
end of peaceful European order and stability established after the end of the Cold War. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and further escalation of the war in eastern 
Ukraine shocked the United States and its European allies. It is the first case in the post-
World War II history when a state that had previously agreed to respect the 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of another European state forcefully 
annexed a part of its territory.299 Russia brutally violated its commitments under the UN 
Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to respect the “inviolability of borders” in 
Europe.300 Furthermore, Russia’s violations of its obligation to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances 
(Budapest Memorandum) provoke significant risks for international security and 
credibility of nuclear non-proliferation policy throughout the world.301 Russia’s 
aggression against Ukraine has become another dangerous precedent of a stronger state 
using force to violate the sovereignty of a weaker state.302 The European security 
architecture, based on peace and liberal values, has faced its “severest, possibly fatal, 
test” in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.303 
The sudden emergence of the conflict has raised the difficult question for the 
United States and its European allies on how to respond to Russia’s aggression against 
Ukraine. Before the conflict, some believe Washington and Western European capitals 
did not pay significant attention to Russia’s possible efforts to challenge the current 
European security order. East-West political and economic interdependence has 
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weakened the American-European perception of Russia’s potential threat.304 Even 
though the United States and its European allies are unified in condemning Russia’s 
aggression against Ukraine as unacceptable, further efforts to construct effective and 
consistent responses reveal a significant division.305 The asymmetry of American-
European interests in Russia has challenged the Western consensus on how to deter 
Russia and support Ukraine.306 As a result, the United States and its European partners 
have only agreed on non-lethal policy responses, such as increased financial and military-
political support of Ukraine, the imposition of various sanctions against Russia, and 
promotion of a diplomatic solution to the conflict.307 This multidimensional approach 
still has not produced a compromise to end the conflict and end Russia’s aggression 
against Ukraine. 
Why have U.S. and German foreign policy decisions diverged regarding the 
ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict? What factors influenced and constrained U.S. and 
German foreign policy options? The following chapter argues that U.S. foreign policy 
decisions were mainly driven by concerns for its superpower status, supported by the 
U.S. president’s own realist ideas. In Germany, the response to the conflict was mainly 
initially driven by power considerations until the killing of 211 EU citizens on July 17, 
2014, when Russian-backed separatists blew up Malaysian Airlines (MH) flight 17. That 
event brought ideas back in as a primary source of German decisions. Both U.S. and 
German domestic politics did little to influence decisions regarding the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict.  
A. OVERVIEW OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT 
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is the apogee of Russia’s long-standing 
efforts to reestablish its political control over Ukraine. Ever since Ukraine obtained its 
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independence in 1991, the Russian political elite has sought special relations with 
Ukraine in order to transform the state into an area of exclusive Russian influence. In 
attempting to prevent Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation, Russia systematically pressured 
Ukraine to align with Moscow by raising tensions over Crimea, provoking two energy 
wars, and actively opposing Ukraine’s membership in NATO and extended economic 
cooperation with the EU.308 In seeking to interrupt the expansion of the EU’s eastern 
partnership to Ukraine, Russia sought to involve Ukraine in its own Customs Union (CU) 
with Belarus, thus ensuring its closer “political integration with a Russian-dominated 
supranational decision making body.”309 On the eve of the Vilnius summit to discuss the 
EU-Ukraine trade agreement, Ukrainian President Yanukovych, after consistent pressure 
from Russia and a secret meeting with President Vladimir Putin, on November 9, 2013, 
suddenly ordered the suspension of negotiations with the EU and, instead, announced 
further talks with Russia about membership in the CU.310  
Yanukovych’s decision triggered massive protests on November 24, 2013, in the 
Ukrainian capital, marking the emergence of an intense political crisis in Ukraine.311 
After months of endless demonstrations, spreading violence on Kyiv’s streets, and more 
than 100 casualties a compromise agreement between the government and opposition was 
reached on February 21, 2014. Yanukovych, upon the signing of the agreement, 
unexpectedly left Kyiv and in a few days fled to Russia. On February 25, the Ukrainian 
parliament voted to remove Yanukovych from office, elected Oleksandr Turchynov as a 
new speaker of the parliament, and made him acting president until new presidential 
elections could be held on May 25.312 It was the end of the Yanukovych era in Ukrainian 
history.  
The Ukraine crisis at this point transformed into a full-scale Russia-Ukraine 
conflict. The rapid and widespread political transformations in Ukraine were a “stunning 
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surprise” for both Western leaders and the Kremlin.313 For Putin, the collapse of the 
Yanukovych regime and the victory of the pro-Western opposition in Kyiv presented 
significant reputational risks and “the perception of historical loss” after his previous 
success with Ukraine.314 After his bitter experience of the 2004–2005 Orange 
Revolution, Putin perceived the Ukraine crisis as the West’s second attempt to impose 
pro-Western authorities in Kyiv using social unrest.315 The presence of Germany and 
Polish foreign ministers in Kyiv during the crucial period of the crisis, in February 2014, 
strengthened Russia’s belief that the West orchestrated the fall of Yanukovych.316 
Publication of a leaked telephone conversation between two senior U.S. officials 
discussing the preferable composition of the new Ukrainian government only added fuel 
to the fire.317 In seeking to prevent Ukraine from “slipping away,” the Kremlin opted for 
a reliable and popular instrument of foreign policy—local separatism.318 Using the 
successful experience of creating permanently frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, 
and South Ossetia, Russia chose Crimea as a primary “target for inflicting a wound that 
would undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and create a pressure 
point to influence Ukraine’s behavior.”319 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea marked the violent starting point of its war with 
Ukraine. Russia’s decision to launch its aggression from Crimea was predictable. The 
presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, the predominantly Russian 
population that includes many retirees from the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces, a long 
history of separatist aspirations, and tensions between the two countries over the 
peninsula made it a logical starting point.320 Pro-Russian separatist demonstrations began 
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in Crimea on February 23, the day after the collapse of Yanukovych regime in Kyiv.321 
Four days later, heavily armed and masked Russian troops invaded Crimea and seized 
airports, regional parliament buildings, other strategic sites, and blockaded Ukrainian 
military bases on the peninsula.322 During March 6–16, Crimea’s authorities held an 
illegal secession referendum, in which some 95.5 percent of those voting approved 
Crimea’s union with Russia.323 On March 18, Putin signed a “treaty” with Crimean and 
Sevastopol city leaders that formally incorporated the Crimean peninsula into Russia, a 
flagrant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.324 On March 24, 
Ukraine withdrew its remaining military personnel from the peninsula after threats made 
by Russian forces against Ukrainian soldiers and their families.325 The Kremlin was not 
satisfied and went further to stir insurrection in eastern Ukraine.  
Only a few weeks after the annexation of Crimea, thousands of Russian-backed 
protestors and armed separatists triggered organized demonstrations in eastern Ukraine 
and seized government buildings in the major cities of the Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions.326 It was a part of a broader Kremlin strategy that was promoted domestically 
using the old imperial Russian term of Novorossiya (New Russia) to refer to the separatist 
enclave of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. This strategy ranged from amassing 
numerous troops on the eastern border of Ukraine, to recruiting and equipping 
combatants to eastern Ukraine, to managing the occupation of government buildings, and 
to establishing the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (Donetskaya Narodnaya 
Respublika, DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika, 
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LNR). Russia also sought, to destabilize the May 25 Ukrainian presidential elections.327 
Through these measures, Russia sought to demonstrate the weakness and illegitimacy of 
the new Ukrainian authorities, as well as the futility of Ukraine’s efforts to join NATO 
and the EU.328 On May 11, 2014, leaders of the armed separatist forces held illegal 
“referendums” on the “sovereignty” of the so-called DNR and LNR.329 According to 
their claims, 89 percent of voters in Donetsk region and 96 percent in Luhansk region 
approved the “referendum” to support the independence of these “republics” from 
Ukraine .330 The referendum is widely seen as fraudulent and illegal outside of Russia.331 
In seeking to restore a constitutional order in its eastern regions, the Ukrainian 
government launched an extensive anti-terrorist operation. 
When Ukrainian authorities started making progress in restoring control over 
several cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in June–July 2014, Russia escalated, 
leading to heavy casualties among Ukrainian military and civilians and further 
occupation of territory. Russia supplied its insurgents with various heavy weapons, 
including “tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and advanced anti-aircraft systems, 
including the BUK surface-to-air missile system.”332 Using one of the BUK missiles, on 
July 17, 2014, Russia-backed separatists used one of the BUK missiles to shoot down 
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over the Donetsk region. The jet was flying from 
Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, and all 298 civilian passengers on board, including 196 
Dutch citizens and representatives of ten other nations, were killed.333  
Although in August 2014 the Ukrainian Armed Forces and “volunteer battalions” 
seemed to be at the verge of defeating the separatists, they faced the Russian army 
                                                 
327 Menon and Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine, 85. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Morelli, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” 13. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Daalder et al., “Preserving Ukraine`s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression,” 2. 
333 “MH17 Ukraine Plane Crash: What We Know,” BBC News, September 28, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880. 
 81 
backing the insurgents.334 The Ukrainian military was smashed in the town of Ilovaisk, as 
Russian regular troops and artillery wiped out entire Ukrainian units, causing hundreds of 
casualties and dozens of burned out tanks and troop carriers, as well as leaving 200 
prisoners of war.335 In seeking to maintain its zone of control in eastern Ukraine, Russia 
brutally invaded Ukraine, demonstrating its direct responsibility for the conflict.336 
After this defeat, Ukraine agreed to start ceasefire talks. On September 5, the 
Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), composed of representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed the Minsk 
protocol as a step toward implementation of the peace plan of Ukrainian President Petro 
Poroshenko and Russian President Putin.337 The protocol, which was facilitated by the 
German and French heads of government, called for 12 measures to de-escalate the 
conflict, including an immediate and bilateral ceasefire under OSCE “monitoring and 
verification,” the “decentralization” of power in Ukraine, the release of all hostages, the 
withdrawal of “illegal armed groups” and military equipment, and other steps.338 None of 
the points of the protocol were fully implemented, however, and further fighting resulted 
in over 1,300 deaths and the additional separatist seizure of over 500 square kilometers of 
Ukrainian territory.339 Recognizing the failure of the Minsk protocol, German Chancellor 
Merkel and French President Francois Hollande attempted another political resolution to 
the conflict. In February 2015, they met in Minsk with the presidents of Ukraine and 
Russia to discuss a new ceasefire agreement.340 After 16 hours of negotiations, the four 
leaders agreed on a new plan, the so-called Minsk-II, intended to update the points of the 
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original protocol, but to little avail.341 Full implementation of the Minsk-II agreement has 
not occurred to date. According to a UN report, from mid-April 2014 to March 12, 2017, 
the Russia-Ukraine war resulted in at least 9,940 people dead and at least 23,455 
injured.342 At the time of this writing, the conflict continues, and the future of the 
Crimean peninsula and occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remains 
uncertain. 
B. THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE  
In response to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the United States took a number of 
measures hoping to promote a diplomatic solution to the conflict and deter further 
aggressive Russian action. U.S. foreign policymakers, however, have been unable to stop 
Russia’s further escalation or resolve the conflict. As noted in Chapter II, under the 
Budapest Memorandum regarding Ukraine’s denuclearization, the United States 
committed to ensure the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Despite this commitment, the 
United States ruled out military actions to eject Russian armed forces from Crimea or 
prevent their further invasion of eastern Ukraine.343 The administration of Barack Obama 
also left the leading role in peace negotiations to Germany and France and held to a 
middle ground policy that sanctioned Russia, but eschewed lethal assistance to 
Ukraine.344 Although the conflict has already lasted for more than three years, decision 
makers in U.S. and European capitals still argue over whether to provide military aid to 
Ukraine and whether it should include lethal weaponry.345  
Instead of military aid, U.S. leaders initiated a series of financial sanctions against 
Russian companies, imposed visa bans and asset freezes against several Russian officials 
responsible for the ongoing conflict, suspended some bilateral cooperation with Russia, 
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and provided financial, technical and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine’s defense and 
security sector.346 While financial sanctions seem to be having a significant impact on the 
Russian economy, affecting the drop of oil prices and reducing export earnings, they have 
not persuaded Russia to end the conflict with Ukraine.347 As a result, former officials and 
members of Congress have criticized U.S. policy. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), 
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, emphasized that “the 
refusal of the administration to step up with more robust support for Ukraine and further 
pressure on Russia is a blight on U.S. policy and 70 years of defending a Europe.”348 
U.S. Ambassador (Ret.) John E. Herbst, in his testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in 2015, went further, declaring that, 
The political class in Washington, policymakers, and influence wielders 
are slowly coming to understand what is going on… Ukraine, the states of 
the former Soviet Union, NATO, and the EU face the problem of Kremlin 
revisionism… The U.S. and Europe placed some mild economic sanctions 
on Russia in response. They were also making every effort in private 
diplomacy…to offer Mr. Putin an “off-ramp” for the crisis. That the West 
had such a tender regard for Mr. Putin’s dignity was not unnoticed in the 
Kremlin and certainly made [his] decision to launch his hybrid war in the 
Donbass easier…The West was slow and weak in confronting the 
Kremlin.349 
 The remainder of this section examines what drove the U.S. to adopt its middle 
ground response regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As the following research 
suggests, the national security interests and changing global power resources of the 
United States are the main drivers of this policy decision. At the same time, realist ideas 
have exceeded the previous ideological approach, confirming the dominance of 
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pragmatic realism in the foreign policy of the Obama administration. Domestic sources of 
U.S. foreign policy have failed to dominate, influencing individual choices rather than the 
broad response to the conflict.   
1. U.S. Security Interests and Geostrategic Position 
Broader national security interests played the key role in the U.S. response to the 
ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. The global geostrategic position of the United States is 
a necessary but not a decisive cause of U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding the Russo-
Ukraine conflict. The U.S. decision to exclude a military resolution of the conflict was 
mainly driven by a Realpolitik motivation based on the pragmatic calculation of U.S. 
national interests. The dynamics and the scope of U.S. security challenges arising from 
military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and the 2009 financial crisis 
weakened its international position. Since 2008, the Obama administration opted for a 
policy of “retrenchment” that implied “highly selective” U.S. engagement in international 
security challenges, a “fairer share of the burden” with its allies, and extended focus on 
domestic problems.350 The Obama administration recognized that the global distribution 
of power was shifting toward multipolarity, which changed its foreign policy from 
Bush’s unilateral and militaristic primacy. In addition, the U.S. geostrategic position 
relative to Russia was one of an equal: equal nuclear capabilities and equal absence of 
significant economic power over one another. As Obama stated, “our strength and 
influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home. We must grow our economy and 
reduce our deficit. We must educate our children to compete in an age where knowledge 
is capital, and the marketplace is global.”351 In addition, while the 2010 National Security 
Strategy confirmed the U.S. status of “the world’s largest economy and most powerful 
military,”352 it recognized the importance of “renewing American leadership” and 
“build[ing] a stronger foundation” for it.353 The relative reduction in U.S. power  
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changed U.S. perceptions of global challenges, revised responses to them, and narrowed 
geostrategic priorities. Its equal position with Russia shaped its decisions regarding 
Ukraine. 
Although the United States under President Obama continued to assist Ukraine in 
building democracy and adopting a pro-Western stance, the United States would not risk 
a full-scale conflict with Russia over it.354 Obama during his speech at West Point in 
May 2014, clearly defined the role of military force in U.S. calculations: 
The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when 
our core interests demand it; when our people are threatened, when our 
livelihoods are at stake; when the security of our allies is in 
danger…[I]nternational opinion matters, but America should never ask 
permission to protect our people, our homeland, our way of life.355 
Conversely, when these U.S. core national interests are not threatened, “then the 
threshold for military action must be higher. In such circumstances, we should not go it 
alone. Instead, we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action,” Obama 
emphasized. He continued, saying that, “We have to broaden our tools to include 
diplomacy and development…and, if just, necessary and effective, multilateral military 
actions.”356 Obama shifted to a foreign policy of strategic restraint after the Bush years of 
unilateral use of military force that overstretched the armed forces and weakened U.S. 
prestige. The Obama administration held to the principle that, in the absence of a direct 
threat to its vital interests, the United States should avoid direct military interventions, 
ignore conflicts of peripheral concern, stay away from costly humanitarian interventions, 
and encourage other states to rely on their own strengths and capabilities.357  
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In ruling out the military response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Obama believed 
in a balance of interests in which one concedes to the state that has the biggest stake in a 
given issue.358 Jeffrey Goldberg, the Atlantic’s editor-in-chief, writes that, “Obama’s 
theory here is simple: Ukraine is a core Russian interest but not an American one, so 
Russia will always be able to maintain escalatory dominance there.”359 Russia’s position 
as a great power armed with nuclear weapons and huge conventional forces ensured that 
the United States would avoid a full-scale war for secondary priorities.360 The U.S. 
middle ground response to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict reflects the Obama 
administration’s realist policy of restraint, based on a pragmatic calculation of national 
interests. Ukraine was of secondary interest to the United States in Obama’s view. 
Instead, his administration was preoccupied with wars and revolutions in the Middle East, 
Iran’s nuclear program, relations with China, and military withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.361  
Russia, on the other hand, was of primary interest to the United States, as it 
understood Russia as a nuclear superpower still capable of destroying it. Before the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict, Obama committed to a foreign policy of “resetting” relations 
with Russia in order to advance a new START arms control agreement in 2010. Further 
U.S. concerns about Russian commitment to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty and the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile created U.S. interests in 
cooperating with Russia in this sphere. As a result, Ukraine vanished from the orbit of 
American interests. Recognizing Russia’s geostrategic position, the Obama 
administration declared, “As the two nations possessing the majority of the world’s 
nuclear weapons, we are working together to advance nonproliferation..”362 Compared 
with its two predecessors, the Obama administration virtually ignored Ukraine, stating 
                                                 
358 Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 
1987). 
359 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” Atlantic (April 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/  
360 David, “Obama: The Reluctant Realist,” 49. 
361 Trenin, “The Ukrainian Crisis and the Assumption of Great-Power Rivalry,” 5. 
362 National Security Strategy, May 2010, 44. 
 87 
only that “we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s 
neighbors.”363  
Limited geostrategic interest in Ukraine caused the slow and selective U.S. 
response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, despite its economic recovery after the global 
financial crisis and President Obama’s newfound confidence in the U.S. ability to lead.364 
Obama declared that, “these complex times have made clear the power and centrality of 
America’s indispensable leadership in the world. We mobilized and are leading global 
efforts to impose costs to counter Russian aggression.”365 The Obama administration, 
however, focused only on diplomatic and economic means in its response and left the 
leading role in resolving the conflict to Germany and France.  
2. Domestic Politics 
Although key decision makers and organized interest groups failed to dominate in 
the U.S. response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, they constrained specific choices, 
preventing a more muscular U.S. response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. On the 
one hand, the bargaining process among the members of Obama’s team reinforced his 
rejection of a U.S. military response to Russia’s actions. Organized interest groups, on 
the other hand, also sought to prevent or weaken financial sanctions against Russia and 
its business sector.  
a. The Obama Administration 
The U.S. foreign policy decision to rule out military engagement in the resolution 
of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was the consequence of debates among members of the 
Obama team, based on their experience of geopolitical victories and defeats. The 
decisions to rule out the use of American force countering Russian aggression in Ukraine, 
as well as to postpone supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine indefinitely, caused a wave of 
criticism from the right, who argued that it brought U.S. deterrent credibility into 
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question.366 A detailed analysis of the interactions and debates between Obama and his 
key policy makers is important for understanding U.S. policy choices regarding the 
Russo-Ukrainian conflict.   
During the two terms of his presidency, Obama and his team faced multiple 
geopolitical challenges that demanded decisive actions and not always led to the desired 
outcomes. In 2009, Obama came into office seeking to strengthen the liberal world order, 
cut military spending, and end the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.367 During 
the 2008 presidential elections, Obama stated in his foreign policy speech, 
I am running for President of the United States to lead this country in a 
new direction—to seize this moment’s promise. Instead of being distracted 
from the most pressing threats that we face, I want to overcome them. 
Instead of pushing the entire burden of our foreign policy on to the brave 
men and women of our military, I want to use all elements of American 
power to keep us safe, and prosperous, and free. Instead of alienating 
ourselves from the world, I want America - once again - to lead.368  
According to Stephen Sestanovich, who served in Republican and Democratic 
administrations, Obama “appears to have had a personal, ideological commitment to the 
idea that foreign policy had consumed too much of the nation’s attention and 
resources.”369 The burden of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as later geopolitical 
challenges in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, step by step caused Obama to become “bogged 
down in geopolitical rivalries he had hoped to transcend.”370 These challenges often were 
met with forceful decisions and the use of American military power in conflict 
resolution—a strategy that contradicted Obama’s personal ideas and beliefs. Goldberg, 
after a series of interviews with Obama, concludes that he “generally does not believe a 
president should place American soldiers at great risk in order to prevent a humanitarian 
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disaster unless those disasters pose a direct security threat to the United States.”371 
Obama appears to be a pragmatic president, who prefers “pulling back, spending less, 
cutting risk, and shifting to allies.”372 As Obama said, “what I think is not smart is the 
idea that every time there is a problem, we send in our military to impose order. We just 
can’t do that.”373 In addition, unlike liberal interventionists, Obama indeed is a follower 
of the foreign policy of realism of President George H.W. Bush and his national security 
advisor, Brent Scowcroft, who, according to Obama, “deftly managed the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union” among other victories.374  
Even though Obama’s personal approach to foreign policy often was reflected in 
U.S. decisions, during his first term, many issues of critical geopolitical importance 
involved a contentious bargaining process among key officials with divergent beliefs and 
interests..375 Obama consciously brought experienced experts with different views into 
his cabinet, reportedly following the “team of rivals” approach of Abraham Lincoln.376 
For his first national security team team, Obama “retained as secretary of defense, Robert 
Gates, and appointed a close ally of McCain’s as national security adviser, General James 
Jones.”377 In addition, key aides, including Susan Rice, Obama’s first-term U.N. 
Ambassador and second-term National Security Advisor, and Samantha Power, NSC 
staffer and second-term U.N. Ambassador, were proponents of armed humanitarian 
intervention. Denis McDonough, first-term Deputy National Security Adviser and 
second-term White House Chief of Staff, was dedicated to implementing the President’s 
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views.378 Secretary Clinton, though a foreign policy hawk, also supported Obama’s 
realism, defending the policy of “principled pragmatism” in relations with Russia, China, 
and Iran “over a range of interests and the resulting need for flexible, case-by-case tactics 
over democracy and human rights.”379 Gates too shared Obama’s pragmatism but 
disagreed with him on the war in Afghanistan.380 Obama cultivated debate amongst his 
advisors during his first term and would take their advice. This system of debate marked 
the first term of Obama’s presidency. After a series of setbacks, it was significantly 
weakened in the second term. 
 Obama’s decisions regarding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict reflected his and his 
team’s previous experience in resolving foreign policy crises. For Obama, Russia 
remained an important strategic ally in arms reduction and Iran’s nuclear program, 
making its 2008 war against Georgia a secondary issue.381 Analysis of his decisions to 
intervene militarily in 2011 in Libya and later to reject military operations in Syria sheds 
light on Obama’s reaction to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. The decision on Libya and its 
bitter consequences weakened Obama’s reliance on his key advisors, as well as 
strengthened the degree of his mistrust of policy advisors and his personal hesitation to 
use military force. Describing the failure of Obama administration’s operation in Libya, 
Goldberg explains, 
Obama did not want to join the fight; he was counseled by Joe Biden and 
his first-term secretary of defense Robert Gates, among others, to steer 
clear. But a strong faction within the national-security team—Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice, who was then ambassador to the 
United Nations, along with Samantha Power, Ben Rhodes, and Anthony 
Blinken, who was then Biden’s national-security adviser—lobbied hard to 
protect Benghazi, and prevailed. (Biden, who is acerbic about Clinton’s 
foreign-policy judgment, has said privately, “Hillary just wants to be 
Golda Meir.”)… But Obama says today of the intervention, “It didn’t 
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work.” The U.S., he believes, planned the Libya operation carefully—and 
yet the country is still a disaster.382 
Despite his personal pragmatic view on foreign policy, Obama accepted the compelling 
advice of the majority, about which he later regretted. 
 The Libyan failure affected Obama’s considerations of Syria. After the operation 
in Libya, Obama seemed less confident in opting for an armed response to Bashar 
Assad’s violent actions in Syria. In the summer of 2011, Obama limited his response to 
only calling on Assad to resign.383 A year later, reacting to the possible use of chemical 
weapons against the Syrians, Obama declared, “We have been very clear to the Assad 
regime…that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons 
moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation.”384 On August 30, 2013, Assad brutally crossed Obama’s red line, killing over 
1,429 people after using chemical weapons.385 Now, the majority of the Obama team 
believed the president would threaten military action.386 The Pentagon had already 
received the order form Obama to prepare a target list for air strikes; and James Clapper, 
the director of national intelligence, met with Obama to make clear that the threat report 
on “Syria’s use of sarin gas” was not another bogus ‘“slam dunk,’” referring to the 
infamous Bush administration intelligence failure in Iraq.387  
While key senior officials in the Pentagon and NSC were in favor of the military 
response and were moving toward war, Obama “had come to believe that he was walking 
into a trap…his doubts were growing.”388 As Goldberg describes, 
[Obama] asked McDonough, his chief of staff, to take a walk with him on 
the South Lawn of the White House. Obama did not choose McDonough 
randomly: He is the Obama aide most averse to U.S. military intervention, 
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and someone, who, in words of one of his colleagues, “thinks in terms of 
traps.” Obama, ordinarily a preternaturally confident man, was looking for 
validation… The president believed, the Pentagon had “jammed” him on a 
troop surge for Afghanistan. Now, on Syria, he was beginning to feel 
jammed again.389 
In the aftermath of the discussion, Obama told his national security team that he 
decided to stand down. This decision shocked the nation security team, which made 
further efforts to change the president’s mind.390 Rice, now the National Security 
Advisor, emphasized serious and lasting consequences for American credibility.391 Other 
key officials such as Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John 
Kerry were not even present when Obama informed his team about the decision.392 
Goldberg concludes that “by 2013, Obama’s resentments were well developed. He 
resented military leaders who believed they could fix any problem if the commander in 
chief would simply give them what they wanted, and he resented the foreign policy think 
tank complex.”393 Obama had lost his taste for collective decision making and now relied 
more on his own pragmatic worldview rather than the divergent and often contradictory 
advice of his foreign policy team. This shift in Obama’s thinking clearly shaped the U.S. 
response to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine. 
By the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in March 2014, Obama mainly relied 
on his own principles in making foreign policy decisions. As Obama’s personal 
pragmatism had only strengthened, other members of the president’s team had fewer 
chances to promote alternative decisions. Strong supporters of military interventionism 
such as Clinton, Kerry, and Power made several attempts to change Obama’s views on 
the means of conflict resolution, but failed. Responding to Clinton’s criticism, Obama 
reminded Clinton of the 2003 Iraq invasion and the danger of making such decisions.394 
Later, when Clinton’s successor, John Kerry, continued to lobby for the policy of 
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interventionism, Obama announced at one of the NSC meetings that only the secretary of 
defense should propose plans for military actions.395 Likewise, all the attempts of several 
top advisors to persuade Obama to authorize supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine failed 
as well.396 As a result, the decisions concerning the Russia-Ukraine conflict reflected 
Obama’s personal realist views on Ukraine and Russia. Obama said, 
Putin acted in Ukraine in response to a client state that was about to slip 
out of his grasp. And he improvised in a way to hang on to his control 
there…Real power means you can get what you want without having to 
exert violence. Russia was much more powerful when Ukraine looked like 
an independent country but was a kleptocracy that he could pull the strings 
on… The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to 
be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do… 
[My position on Ukraine is] realistic. But this is an example of where we 
have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are 
willing to go to war for.397 
Obama did not hide his skepticism regarding Ukraine, perceiving the state as Russia’s 
neighbor, weaker and not as important for the United States compared with Russia. 
Unlike his predecessors Clinton and Bush, Obama did not pay an official visit to Ukraine, 
passing this job to Vice-President Biden.398 Many of Obama’s top advisors sought to 
persuade him to shift to a stronger response to the conflict and eventually failed. Instead, 
the U.S. rejection of military involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict was the outcome 
of Obama’s pragmatic realism. For Obama, the bitter experience of U.S. failure in armed 
interventions and his reluctance to repeat them again were the decisive factors that 
blocked his team’s desire to use military means in conflict resolution.  
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b. Interest Groups Politics 
Unlike U.S. decision makers focused on shaping the strategic response to the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict, organized business lobbies were seeking to constrain the 
imposition of financial sanctions against Russia. Today, there is little evidence that 
business lobbies significantly shaped U.S. sanctions against Russia, though individual 
companies met with some success. Even though business lobbies could not shape a broad 
set of U.S. responsive measures, they predictably focused on preventing or, at least, 
minimizing the consequences of sanctions against Russia on their economic interests.  
When the United States first imposed sanctions against Russian officials and 
companies in March 2014, the event shocked U.S. companies that trade with or invest in 
Russia.399 Just a year previously, U.S. business lobbies had successfully pushed Congress 
to cancel the last Cold War-era trade restriction on Russia.400 Now, these interest groups 
faced a new complex challenge. They said that financial sanctions could lead to the 
collapse of U.S. and European banks with hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian loans 
and investments.401 Top U.S. companies such as Exxon Mobil, Boeing, Pepsi, Ford, and 
General Electric have significant financial stakes in Russia.402 As a result, both U.S. and 
Russian companies lobbied the Obama administration and Congress, seeking to constrain 
the U.S. response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
Business groups warned the Obama administration and Congress to avoid 
unilateral actions that “would put tens of billions of dollars of American investment and 
trade at risk of retaliation.”403 Instead, they argued that economic sanctions against 
Russia should be a multilateral decision of as many states as possible. William Reinsch, 
president of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), commenting on the results of 
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his meetings with White House officials and members of Congress, emphasized, “We 
have not been shy about telling them…if it is not multilateral, it is not going to work.”404 
At the same time, the U.S.-Russia Business Council, the Washington-based trade 
association representing the interests of its U.S. and Russian member companies on 
commercial matters, also mobilized its efforts.405 On March 5, 2014, representatives of 
the Council met with U.S. National Security Council staff to express their concerns and 
promote their economic interests in Russia.406 It is unclear whether these meetings 
somehow shifted the U.S. primary approach to financial sanctions. Further escalation of 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to new U.S.-EU multilateral sanctions, which, in turn, 
demanded additional efforts from lobbying companies and individual U.S. and Russian 
businesses. 
There is proof that the U.S. energy giant Exxon Mobil, with large economic 
stakes in Russia, successfully delayed sanctions that would hurt the company. Due to the 
U.S. sanctions against Russia, Exxon Mobil lost billions of dollars and postponed 
important drilling projects with Russian oil giant PAO Rosneft.407 These companies 
collaborate on ten joint ventures in the Russian Arctic, the Black Sea, and western 
Siberia.408 At Exxon’s 2014 annual meeting, Rex Tillerson, then the chief executive of 
Exxon Mobil, stated, “We do not support sanctions, generally, because we do not find 
them to be effective unless they are very well implemented comprehensibly, and that is 
very hard thing to do. So we always encourage the people who are making those 
decisions to consider the very broad collateral damage of who are they really 
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harming.”409 In 2014, the U.S. sanctions against Russia prohibited the transfer of 
advanced offshore and shale oil technologies to Russia; Exxon was obliged to suspend all 
offshore drilling cooperation with Rosneft by September 26, 2014.410 The company had 
an unfinished $700 million drilling project with the Russian oil giant in the Kara Sea 
(Arctic).411 Exxon received a temporary reprieve from the Treasury Department until 
October 10, 2017, arguing that Russia’s security services had threatened to literally seize 
the rig.412 Only a few weeks later, Exxon Mobil successfully discovered a major field 
with about 750 million barrels for Rosneft.413  
Exxon Mobil’s second successful lobbying operation happened at the end of 
2016. The company lobbied against the STAND for Ukraine Act in Congress, a bill that 
would have made the sanctions against Russia law for five years, making it more difficult 
for the next U.S. administration to cancel them.414 In addition, “Exxon also lobbied the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee” seeking to prevent other bills targeted to punish 
Russia for aggression in Ukraine.415 Furthermore, Exxon Mobil involved trade 
associations, such as the American Petroleum Institute and the U.S.-Russia Business 
Council, where Tillerson had been a board member. Subsequently, the STAND for the 
Ukraine bill “stalled” at the hands of Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), who explained his 
decision as due to the absence of bipartisan support in the Senate.416 Exxon Mobil was 
able to carve out exceptions to U.S. sanctions against Russia and demonstrated, to some 
degree, successful lobbying efforts. 
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There is also a Russian business lobby in Washington, D.C., that seeks to protect 
the interests of the Russian government in the United States. In the summer of 2014, 
Gazprombank, “a banking subsidiary of the Russian oil giant” Gazprom, paid $150,000 
to the law firm Squire, Patton, Boggs to lobby “the Senate and the Department of State on 
the sanctions and other banking laws” against Russia.417 The team of lobbyists included  
former Republican Senators Trent Lott and John Breaux, former ambassador Joseph 
LeBaron, and former first deputy administrator of the Transportation Security 
Administration Stephen McHale.418 Simultaneously, two other large Russian state banks, 
Sberbank and VTB Group, lobbied Congress to minimize financial sanctions against 
Russia and themselves.419 While the two state banks play an important role in financing 
Russian government programs and its military-industrial complex, VTB has gone even 
further, successfully listing on the U.S. stock market and raising $90 billion in debt 
financing for private and state-run Russian companies.420 According to the Atlantic, 
 [In 2016], Sberbank and VTB collectively spent hundreds of thousands of 
dollars lobbying against U.S. sanctions, according to lobbying disclosure 
reports. Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank, paid a total of $425,000 to two 
Washington, D.C., firms last year in order to lobby Congress, the State 
Department, and the Department of Commerce for “possible ways to 
address sanctions relief,” according to all of the disclosures. VTB Group, 
the country’s second-largest bank, hired a different firm in May, paying 
them $17,500 a month for lobbying related to U.S. sanctions, according to 
a copy of the contract submitted to the Department of Justice under the 
Federal Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), which lobbyists are 
required to submit when they do work for foreign clients.421  
Russian business lobbies have concentrated significant forces on easing financial 
sanctions against Russia and against these companies in particular. The analysis of U.S. 
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and Russian business lobbies’ actions has confirmed that they, as organized interest 
groups, are a factor in influencing foreign policy. However, the detailed effect of this 
lobbying on the U.S. decision making process is a matter of additional research. 
3. U.S. Ideas 
In contrast to the Bush administration’s emphasis on democracy in the preceding 
chapter, the Obama administration focused on promoting the liberal internationalist ideas 
of multilateralism and engagement, ideas that align with Obama’s vision of pragmatic 
realism. These ideas did not play the primary role in the U.S. multidimensional response 
to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, but they acted as a complementary factor 
strengthening the Realpolitik logic of foreign policy decisions of the Obama 
administration. Once Obama became U.S. President in 2008, he proposed an idea of 
American engagement seeking to break off with the unilateralist Bush foreign policy that 
disappointed many around the world.422 The policy of engagement, outlined in the 2010 
National Security Strategy, confirmed the U.S. desire to rely less on its military strength 
and redistribute the burden of global and regional problems to close allies and 
partners.423 Obama’s engagement policy determined that “diplomacy is as fundamental to 
our national security as our defense capability. Our diplomats are the first line of 
engagement, listening to our partners, learning from them, building respect for one 
another, and seeking common ground.”424 In contrast to the previous administration’s 
interventionism, the Obama administration would rely on “diplomacy, development, and 
international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent conflict, and 
maintain peace, mitigating where possible the need for the use of force.”425 Furthermore, 
recognizing the use of force as the last means of conflict resolution, the Obama 
administration preferred to “exhaust other options before war…and carefully weigh the 
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costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction.”426 Thus, the idea of 
engagement confirmed the U.S. shift to pragmatic realism, where the level of the U.S. 
response to a conflict correlated with its interests and priorities.   
In addition, the idea of multilateralism also served as an important means of 
advancing U.S. national interests and rebuilding its reputation globally.427 As Obama 
explained, “One of the reasons I am so focused on taking action multilaterally where our 
direct interests are not at stake is that multilateralism regulates hubris.”428 This idea 
found a broad expression in the 2010 National Security Strategy: 
Alliances are force multipliers: through multinational cooperation and 
coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone. 
We will continue to maintain the capacity to defend our allies against old 
and new threats. We will also continue to closely consult with our allies as 
well as newly emerging partners and organizations so that we revitalize 
and expand our cooperation to achieve common objectives… Although 
the United States and our allies and partners may sometimes disagree on 
specific issues, we will act based on mutual respect and in a manner that 
continues to strengthen an international order that benefits all responsible 
international actors.429 
The dominant ideas of engagement and multilateralism are reflected in the U.S. middle 
ground response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, including its primary focus on diplomatic 
means, rejection of a military solution, and recognition that Germany and France as 
regional actors should lead in solving this regional challenge. U.S. adherence to the idea 
of multilateralism played a role in Obama’s decision to postpone supplying lethal 
weapons to Ukraine after the Germans expressed their strong opposition. In general, these 
ideas can be tools of U.S. Realpolitik approach, based on the pragmatic calculation of 
national security interests and different perception of the main and secondary threats.430 
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The liberal ideas of democracy and freedom that often influence U.S. foreign 
policy decisions failed to dominate in the Obama administration. Compared to the 
previous Bush administration, democracy promotion occupied a secondary place in 
Obama’s foreign policy—“albeit couched in a deliberately much toned down 
rhetoric.”431 U.S. funds for democracy promotion went down at United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in the Obama administration compared with the 
Bush administration, which had increased it after the Russian invasion of Georgia. It was 
only after Russia invaded Ukraine that it received increased funding from $22 million in 
2014 to $66 million in 2015 for democracy promotion.432 As a USAID senior official 
mentioned, while the Obama administration in one of its final acts in December 2016 
asked for funds to counter “Russian aggression in the Europe and Eurasia region,” it was 
Congress that “upped the countering Russian aggression piece substantially from our 
initial request of $10 million.”433 Despite Russian propaganda claims that Obama’s 
administration spent $5 billion to overthrow Ukrainian President Yanukovych, U.S. 
government agencies, from 2009 until 2014, spent $456.4 million total in Ukraine for all 
projects, not just democracy promotion.434 
In sum, despite U.S. commitments under the Budapest Memorandum, the United 
States opted for a middle ground, non-lethal response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
Rather than sending lethal military aid or troops, it promoted a diplomatic solution, 
sanctions against Russia, and financial, non-lethal military and technical assistance to 
Ukraine. The United States supported Germany’s role as a chief negotiator between 
Russia and Ukraine and ruled out a military response to Russia’s aggression against 
Ukraine. These decisions were the result of the U.S. pragmatic realism based on a 
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calculation of core national interests and the perception of Ukraine as a secondary 
priority.   
C. GERMANY AND RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE 
In contrast to the United States, Germany’s response to the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict has marked the return of its traditional ideational approach to foreign policy. 
Even though initially Germany’s decisions were driven mainly by its economic interests 
and secondarily by domestic politics, the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 tragedy three 
months into the conflict led to the renaissance of German ideas dominating foreign policy 
decisions. From the very beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany played a 
leading role in formulating a unified Western response to Russia’s actions “built on the 
threat of massive sanctions in combination with constant diplomatic engagement.”435 
Although Germany ruled out the use of military force in the conflict resolution, it was 
ready to act as the main peace mediator and promoter of tougher sanctions regarding 
Russia.436 Whether the Ukrainian crisis has permanently shifted German foreign policy 
to a more ideas-driven track is unclear.  
Germany’s response has provoked a mixed reaction among experts and 
journalists. Critics, such as John Vinocur, charge that “Germany’s new, projected 
engagement in foreign policy leadership boils down to making sure its old ‘let’s-talk-this-
over’ and ‘maybe-we-can-do-nothing’ approaches stay in place.”437 Others emphasize 
that “the shift that is taking place in German foreign policy is subtler and less complete 
than this response suggests.”438 However, there are those who underscore Germany’s 
vital role in formulating the unified Western response to the conflict. Matthew 
Karnitschnig notes that, “Germany’s size and economic weight make its voice especially 
crucial. Without Berlin’s backing, U.S. attempts to box in Russia through sanctions and 
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other measures will be hampered.”439 Ulrich Speck notes that, while in the past 
“Germany’s role has been limited and overshadowed by U.S. leadership in Europe” and 
its usual tandem with France, the Russia-Ukraine conflict changed this, revealing both a 
U.S. desire to yield leadership and act as “an outside partner” to a largely German-led 
EU, and “little [French] interest in being in the center of the action.”440 Others stress that 
it is important to remember that Germany’s foreign policy decisions remain a part of the 
EU common foreign policy that needs a consensus of 28 member states. Elizabeth Pond 
emphasizes that “Berlin regularly helps to build a consensus by digging into its deep 
pockets” and “lending a sympathetic ear to the smallest, as well as the biggest, members 
and formulating ways to blend varied interests.”441 Germany, in this view, has 
transformed into the EU’s “indispensable nation” and so called “chief facilitating 
officer.”442  
During the initial months of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany faced a major 
division among the EU members. These cleavages regarding the common response arose 
from their long-held disagreements on Russia, substantial economic ties of the most 
influential EU members with Russia, and fear of negative economic consequences of 
sanctions against Russia for European economies.443 Consequently, the initial European 
response to Russia’s aggression targeted Putin’s close officials rather than key sectors of 
the Russian economy and “were widely seen as little more than a slap on the wrist.”444 
The July 2014 shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 changed the perception 
of the Russia-Ukraine conflict for Germany and its EU partners alike. In the aftermath of 
the event, Germany and other EU members abandoned their hesitation and disagreements 
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and deepened economic sanctions against Russia. This event removed the disunity 
between the EU and the United States regarding a common response to Russia’s 
actions.445 German Chancellor Merkel “took a tougher line” and found a consensus 
among EU members.446  Germany became the coordinator of a unified European 
approach to Russia mainly based on the extension of economic sanctions against the 
aggressor.447 It significantly increased the level of its engagement in the conflict’s 
resolution. Germany promoted the diplomatic track, leading the “Normandy Four” 
together with France, Russia, and Ukraine.448 First, Merkel focused on a ceasefire 
agreement, which was achieved in Minsk in September 2014. Later, the German leader 
“invested a great deal of personal authority” in contributing to the new Minsk-2 ceasefire 
agreement in February 2015.449  
1. German Geostrategic Position and National Interests 
Germany’s material power resources shaped its stance regarding Russia’s 
invasion in Ukraine in two ways. First, its economic might and interdependence with 
Russia led it to assume the lead over EU policy regarding the conflict. Second, its 
economic interdependence relative to Russia led it initially to reduce the damage to its 
economy by limiting the sanctions applied to Russia in retaliation for its aggression.  
In 2011, Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski made the remarkable 
statement that, “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear its inactivity. You 
have become Europe’s indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead.”450 As Kundnani 
notes, 
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German power is characterized by a strange mixture of economic 
assertiveness and military abstinence. Germany is increasingly using its 
economic power within Europe to impose its preferences on other member 
states—and in that sense is “normal.” But it has few of the ambitions of 
France and the UK to project power beyond Europe, where it seeks above 
all to sell more cars and machines, and in particular rejects the use of 
military force—in that sense it is “abnormal.”451 
Since 2008, Germany has only strengthened its role as the European embedded 
hegemon.452 Others label Germany a “geo-economic power” or a “reluctant 
hegemon.”453 In 2010, Germany took the “driver’s seat in Europe,” due to the 
combination of its national strength and the weakness of other states; by the end of the 
2014, “the rest of the world looked to Germany as an example to follow.”454  
With regard to the Ukraine crisis, according to Marco Siddi, “Germany’s position 
was seen as decisive for the overall EU stance vis-à-vis Russia. As the leading economic 
power in the EU and Russia’s main European commercial partner, Germany steered EU 
foreign policy.”455 Andrew Moravcsik agrees, arguing that “Germany has been Europe’s 
most capable and committed government… Geo-economic influence, not military 
influence plays the decisive role on the margin in combatting Russian influence in places 
like Ukraine—and such influence is overwhelmingly European.”456 In July 2016 Merkel 
stated that, “Germany’s economic and political weight means that it is our duty to take on 
responsibility for Europe’s security in association with our European and transatlantic 
partners in order to defend human rights, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and 
international law.”457 Thus, Germany’s enormous economic power position relative to 
                                                 
451 Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power, 103. 
452 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe; Note: for more 
details see the Chapter III of this thesis. 
453 Matthijs, “The Three Faces of German Leadership,” 140. 
454 Matthijs, “The Three Faces of German Leadership,” 138. 
455 Marco Siddi, “German Foreign Policy toward Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A 
New Ostpolitik?” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (2016): 668. 
456 Andrew Moravcsik, “Lessons from Ukraine: Why a Europe-Led Geo-Economic Strategy Is 
Succeeding,” Transatlantic Academy (2015-16 Paper Series No. 10): 25. 
457 Angela Merkel in the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 
(Berlin: The Federal Government: 2016), 6. 
 105 
other members of the EU and status as the fourth largest economy in the world 
determined its decision to take a leading role in the Western response to the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. 
Germany’s weaker position relative to Russia, however, initially prevented a more 
forceful response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Germany’s economic interdependence 
with Russia, its weaker military power, geographic proximity, and limited natural 
resources continue to reduce Germany’s ability to use armed forces in the resolution of 
security challenges. Härtel emphasizes that while in 2013 the annual trade between 
Russia and Germany reached €76.5 billion, around 300,000 German jobs also depended 
on commercial relations with Russia.458 Germany is Russia’s third largest consumer of 
Russian exports (after China and Netherlands), and Germany is the second largest (after 
China) supplier of goods to Russia.459 Moravcsik argues that the EU, led by Germany, 
“possesses more intense interests [in Russia]…. it trades ten times more with 
Russia…[and] takes almost all of Russian energy exports.”460 Europe as a whole is the 
largest market for Russian exports, while the United States only makes up a 3 percent 
share of Russia’s total exports.461  
Matthijs emphasizes that while “Germany remains dangerously dependent on oil 
and natural gas from Russia,” its “reliance on exports also makes it vulnerable to growth 
slowdowns abroad.”462 In addition, Matthijs continues, “Berlin suffers from a large 
military deficit and remains a dwarf in foreign and security policy.”463 It is a non-nuclear 
state, unlike Britain and France, and therefore would seek to avoid an armed 
confrontation with nuclear superpower Russia. Consequently, although Germany is the 
                                                 
458 André Härtel, “Germany and the Crisis in Ukraine: Divided over Moscow?” Royal Institute 
Elcano, May 8, 2014, 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/
elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari24-2014-hartel-germany-ukraine-crisis-divided-over-moscow. 
459 “Russia,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/. 
460 Moravcsik, “Lessons from Ukraine: Why a Europe-Led Geo-Economic Strategy Is Succeeding,” 
24–25. 
461 “Russia,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
462 Matthijs, “The Three Faces of German Leadership,” 143. 
463 Ibid. 
 106 
leading European economic power, its weak military position in a broad sense influenced 
Germany’s decisions to rule out a military response to Russia’s aggression and reject the 
idea of providing lethal weapons assistance to Ukraine. 
At the outset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany continued relying mainly 
on its narrow economic interests as it did at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. Matthijs 
confirms that, in elevating its economic interests over ideas and norms, Germany “has 
been less shy about imposing its national preferences onto others, and has shifted to a 
more selective multilateralism with a more realist approach to international affairs.”464 
Although Berlin strongly opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, blaming it for violating 
international law, it was indecisive regarding further actions, recognizing that “any 
economic- and financial-sanctions regime against Russia would hurt Germany’s economy 
and business interests more than most other EU members.”465 Indeed, by July 2014 the 
German economy, which provided more than 25 percent of the EU’s output, 
demonstrated a 4 percent decline—the biggest one since 2009.466 Furthermore, as Szabo 
states, “for Germany, Russia is not only a large neighbor but a country in which its 
economic interests far outweigh those that it has in Ukraine.”467 Unsurprisingly, at the 
beginning of the conflict, Merkel sought to resolve it diplomatically, particularly through 
personal negotiations with Putin.  
After the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner and Russia’s expansion of the 
military conflict to eastern Ukraine, however, German leaders concluded that Russia “has 
gone in one year from being a difficult partner to being an adversary.”468 Many agree that 
“had the Malaysian airliner not been shot down, the EU probably would not have agreed 
to impose such biting sanctions.”469 Germany and its EU allies realized that pragmatic 
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calculation of national interests has its limits. They could not tolerate such a brutal 
violation of core international norms and human values. The Russia-Ukraine conflict 
became an international challenge rather than the interstate crisis. German ideas once 
again became the main driver of foreign policy decisions. 
2. German Ideas 
At the outset of the conflict, Germany faced a dilemma of finding a balance 
between core values and large economic and energy interests in bilateral relations with 
Russia.470 Szabo emphasizes that the Cold War Ostpolitik policy of détente and 
engagement with the Russians became the basis for initial decisions toward Russia and 
Ukraine trying to minimize the collision between core values and pragmatic economic 
interests.471 Even though Germany’s policy makers expressed criticism of Russia’s 
violation of core international norms, they still believed in the tenets of Ostpolitik, trying 
to continue a cooperative approach in relations with Russia and resolve the conflict by 
diplomatic means.472 Siddi argues that initially, in using its growing influence in EU 
foreign policy together with a legacy of Ostpolitik, Germany achieved “the trust of all 
sides in the Ukraine crisis..473  
However, Fix and Keil note that in the aftermath of the MH17 tragedy “the idea 
that Russia could be changed through rapprochement disappeared from government 
speeches, as well as the label ‘strategic partner.’”474 Russia’s military aggression in 
Ukraine “clashed with two…pillars of Germany’s positioning in the international arena, 
European integration and transatlanticism.”475 Germany could no longer tolerate Russia’s 
violent actions; its core values thereafter drove foreign policy decisions above its bilateral 
economic relations. German policy makers shifted to an ideas-driven approach, in which 
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multilateralism, democracy, pacifism, and respect for human rights were the major 
drivers of foreign policy decisions regarding the conflict. Before the conflict, Matthijs 
argues that, “German ideas, both in the areas of economics and foreign policy, have been 
very influential in the process of European integration.”476 In addition, Germany’s idea 
of itself as a civilian power influenced “EU’s vision of soft-power projection in the 
world” based on “universal values of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law.”477 Despite previous disagreements with its NATO allies on the 2003 military 
intervention in Iraq or at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, after mid-2014 Germany 
again reemphasized the ideas of multilateralism, European integration and transatlantic 
unity. This emphasis is apparent in the 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr, in which Merkel declares that “Our security is based on a 
strong and resolute North Atlantic Alliance and a united and resilient European Union. 
We will be able to meet the great challenges of our era successfully if we strengthen and 
further develop these two pillars of our foreign, security and defense policy.”478 Despite 
previously divergent German and U.S. views on various global and regional challenges 
and their resolution, Germany declared itself ready to lead and contribute to the collective 
security and solidarity with its key allies. 
At the same time, Germany’s ideas of a civilian state and pacifism were major 
determinants of its decision to rule out a Western military response to the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict and caused its strong opposition to providing Ukraine with lethal weapons aid. In 
2016, the German government declared that “[t]he renaissance of traditional power 
politics, which involves the use of military means to pursue national interests and entails 
considerable armaments efforts, elevates the risk of violent interstate conflict—even in 
Europe and its neighborhood, as is illustrated by the example of Russian actions in 
Ukraine.”479 According to Szabo, the Germans continue to view themselves as “anti-
militarist, even pacifist, and exceptional in their rejection of the use of military force à la 
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the [United States], France and the United Kingdom.”480 As a result, they have not 
sought to build their nation into a military great power, but an economic one. Explaining 
Germany’s hesitation in using military force, Germany’s Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
said in 2016, 
Germans share a deeply held, historically rooted conviction that their 
country should use its political energy and resources to strengthen the rule 
of law in international affairs. Our historical experience has destroyed any 
belief in national exceptionalism—for any nation. Whenever possible, we 
choose Recht (law) over Macht (power). As a result, Germany emphasizes 
the need for legitimacy in supranational decision-making and invests in 
UN-led multilateralism. …Germany will continue to frame its 
international posture primarily in civilian and diplomatic terms and will 
resort to military engagement only after weighing every risk and every 
possible alternative.481 
This civilian approach played out over the 2000s, resulting in Germany’s opposition to 
military intervention in Iraq and Libya, and only strengthened in the aftermath of the 
West’s bitter experience in Afghanistan and Syria.482 These ideas, which have ensured its 
military weakness, fundamentally shaped Germany’s perception of interstate conflicts, 
particularly the Russia-Ukraine one.  
3. Domestic Politics 
Both coalitional politics and organized interest groups failed to play a significant 
role in Germany’s multidimensional response to the Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. 
While at the beginning of the conflict these factors added some ambiguity and hesitation 
to Germany’s initial decisions, Russia’s later escalation made their role negligible. 
a. Coalitional Politics 
Unlike in the U.S. case, Germany’s foreign policy decisions regarding the Russia-
Ukraine conflict were neither constrained nor significantly pushed forward by 
competition between coalitional partners. Russia’s brutal violation of Germany’s core 
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values and international norms led to consensus within Germany’s grand coalition 
government after some initial differences. Unlike the case of the Bucharest NATO 
Summit, the power of the Foreign Minister did not constrain the state’s broad response to 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Germany’s governing coalition before and during 
the conflict consisted of the same duumvirate of Christian Democratic Chancellor Merkel 
and Social Democratic Foreign Minister Steinmeier as it had in 2005–2009. “German 
foreign policy,” as a result, “remains an elite affair that is resolved within a notably stable 
centrist consensus.”483 In July 2014, both leaders formed a unified front in seeking 
resolution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. According to Forsberg, the standard assumption 
of foreign policy experts is that Steinmeier and his Social Democratic party are willing to 
constrain decisions unfavorable to Russia by promoting “the cooperative Ostpolitik 
tradition in German foreign policy.”484 While “the Social Democrats were inclined to 
downplay criticism of Russia and seek a more accommodating line before the Ukrainian 
crisis,” later this key party in the grand coalition “was more critical towards Russia that 
might have been expected.”485 Eventually, Merkel and Steinmeier minimized differences 
in their parties’ stances regarding Germany’s approach toward Russia, such that they 
became “more a matter of emphasis that a real clash of two separate foreign policy 
lines.”486  
The German response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine resulted in a new strategy 
that emerged over the course of 2014, in which Steinmeier played the ‘good cop’ with 
Russia and Merkel, the ‘bad cop.’487 Prior to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Steinmeier still 
sought to reanimate and strengthen cooperation with Russia, adding some ambiguity 
about how Germany would initially respond to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.488 
According to André Härtel, “Steinmeier, who again took the post of Foreign Minister in 
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late 2013, had initially high hopes for a renewal of his earlier ‘partnership for 
modernization’ approach and—as a gesture—appointed Gernot Erler, an expert on Russia 
known for advocating a policy of ‘trying to understand’ and engaging with Putin’s Russia 
through dialogue and close cooperation, as his special coordinator for Russia.”489 This 
reflected Steinmeier’s center-left Social Democratic Party philosophy, which holds that 
“the way forward is to try harder and to engage even more with the Kremlin” and 
“consider[s] a more confrontational approach dangerous, as Russia might completely slip 
away from the West and move toward a more hostile position.”490 Consequently, 
Steinmeier at first refused to support sanctions against Russia and disagreed with the 
Western decision to remove Russia from the G8.491 Even though by November 2014 
Merkel and Steinmeier had declared their strong agreement in foreign policy decisions on 
Russia and Ukraine, Steinmeier continued making pro-Russian public statements, leading 
experts to conclude that Merkel and Steinmeier were coordinating their actions.492 
Steinmeier’s reflected the “good cop, bad cop” strategy, where he used political “carrots” 
for Russia promoting a diplomatic solution to the conflict, while Merkel focused on 
“sticks” pushing forward a strong response, particularly financial sanctions.493 
Chancellor Merkel, however, played the decisive role in formulating the unified 
response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Playing the ‘bad cop,’ Merkel adopted a 
“confrontational approach” toward Russia threatening it “with massive sanctions if 
Moscow openly attacked and invaded Ukraine.”494 According to Larrabee, Merkel 
demonstrated “firm leadership” pushing forward “a toughening of the sanctions [against 
Russia] after the shooting down of the Malaysian commercial airliner MH 17 in July 
2014.”495 Furthermore, she played a central role in creating the unified United States-EU 
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approach toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict, becoming the key negotiator between 
Russia and the West, as well as between the EU and the United States.496 In 2015, during 
the press conference with President Putin, she openly defined the Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea as “criminal.”497  
To ensure domestic support, Merkel gave Steinmeier “the green light for his 
attempts to find a cooperative solution to the crisis.”498 Involving him as a ‘good cop,’ 
Merkel not only balanced her “sticks” approach toward Russia but was able to show 
Russia’s unwillingness to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.499 According to Speck, 
“by exhausting diplomatic means, [Steinmeier] demonstrated that Russia, not Germany or 
the EU, was to blame for the lack of cooperation. This, in turn, made a shift to more 
robust measures such as sanctions appear inevitable.”500 Merkel and Steinmeier in a 
similar fashion worked to minimize Western concern that Germany would favor Russia, 
while still being able to exercise leverage with Moscow. In this sense, according to 
Härtel, “the former is trying to convince Germany’s Western partners of the sincerity of 
its commitments to the alliance and international law, whereas the latter is trying to 
preserve an open channel for Moscow, thereby enhancing its scope for manoeuvre.”501 
Consequently, longstanding differences on foreign policy concerning Russia within 
Germany’s coalitional government did not significantly affect the foreign policy 
outcome. Chancellor Merkel’s personal leadership and mastery at finding a compromise 
with core members of the grand coalition resulted in Germany’s unified response to the 
conflict. Despite her efforts, resolution of the ongoing conflict remains distant.  
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b. Organized Interest Groups 
By 2014, the enormous economic interdependence between Germany and Russia 
had created a strong lobby formed of German and Russian businesses dependent on the 
other’s national markets. Kundnani states that “German companies demand that the 
German state make policy that promotes their interests; they in turn help politicians 
maximize growth and in particular employments levels—the key measure of success in 
German politics.”502 As noted earlier, 300,000 German laborers depend on Russia’s 
market; consequently, “all major German political parties have an electoral stake in good 
relations with Russia”503  
German organized interest groups tried but failed to determine Germany’s key 
decisions toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict. According to Forsberg, “the business lobby 
first resisted the sanctions [against Russia] but then accepted them, albeit with a reminder 
of their negative consequences for the German economy and hopes for their swift 
end.”504 During the first stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, business lobbies 
predictably sought to prevent economic sanctions against Russia; they “spoke out in favor 
of dialogue with Moscow and even expressed some understanding for its position.”505 
Indeed, according to the Wall Street Journal, in May 2014 many officials in Berlin 
recognized that,  
Some 6,200 German companies, from industrial giants such as 
Volkswagen to small family-owned machine-makers, are active in Russia, 
more than those in the rest of the EU combined. Many of those companies, 
both in public and behind the scenes, have warned that any sanctions 
affecting the trade with Russia could cost tens of thousands of German 
jobs and hit the economy hard.”506 
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Leading German business giants including BASF SE, Siemens AG, Volkswagen 
AG, Adidas AG and Deutsche Bank AG expressed their strong opposition to broad 
economic sanctions against Russia.507 Eckhard Cordes, a former Daimler AG executive 
and a chief of the Ost-Ausschuss (OA) lobbying company, stated, “If there is a single 
message we have as business leaders, then it is this: sit down at the negotiating table and 
resolve these matters peacefully.”508 Herbert Hainer, chief executive of Adidas, proposed 
that politicians engage more with Putin: “One has to wonder if someone like Putin should 
not have been included in the process much earlier, instead of waiting until it was too 
late.”509 Frank Appel, chief executive of Deutsche Post, said, “One should think in 
advance about the results of a policy bringing about political change in the forecourt of a 
great power.”510 Private business, in their view, should not be responsible for U.S. and 
E.U.’s political faults. Joe Kaeser, chief executive of technology giant Siemens, went 
even further and just a few days after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, on March 26, 2014 
privately visited Putin in Moscow where he said that his company “will not let its long-
term planning suffer from short-term turbulences.”511 At the end of April 2014, former 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, now the chairman of Gazprom’s Nord Stream 
AG, organized the celebration of his 70
th
 birthday in St. Petersburg, thereby reaffirming 
the close ties between Gazprom and German business.512 Among the guests were 
representatives from Wintershall, BASF’s gas subsidiary, German power company E. ON 
SE, as well as Rüdiger Freiherr von Fritsch-Seerhausen, Germany’s Ambassador to 
Russia and Philipp Missfelder, the Foreign Affairs Speaker of the Bundestag grand 
coalition.513 
In just a few months, however, the German business lobby shifted to more 
supportive views on sanctions against Russia. By May 2014, several of Merkel’s 
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meetings with key German business leaders resulted in their support of tougher 
Germany’s decisions regarding Russia.514 Markus Kerber, director-general of the 
Federation of German Industries, recognized that Russia’s violation of international law 
could not be tolerated, and that core ideas and values stood above economic interests.515 
The July 2014 MH17 tragedy only strengthened this view, inspiring German business 
lobbies to support the government’s foreign policy decisions toward Russia despite the 
economic consequences.516 Core ideas and values and Merkel’s personal involvement 
influenced business lobbies’ reaction on economic sanctions against Russia, not the other 
way around. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict remains one of the main tests of the 
reliability of Europe’s security architecture, as well as unity within NATO and the EU. 
The foreign policy decisions of the United States and Germany became the cornerstone 
of the economic and diplomatic Western response to Russia’s revisionist ambitions and 
its brutal violation of international norms. Although the United States and its European 
allies agreed that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are unacceptable, the asymmetry of their 
interests and power positions relative to Russia led them to take only non-violent 
retaliatory measures, in combination with an unconditional rejection of a military 
response. Despite U.S. commitments under the Budapest Memorandum to ensure the 
sovereignty and territorial independence of Ukraine, the United States was unable to 
prevent the escalation of the conflict and laid the responsibility of peace negotiations on 
Germany and France. While the U.S. middle ground response regarding the Russia-
Ukraine conflict remained mainly driven by geostrategic interests and Obama’s realism, 
Germany’s active engagement in conflict resolution marked the renaissance of its ideas-
driven approach to foreign policy. The Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to be one of the 
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main security challenges for the United States and Germany. Even though Western 
responses to the conflict demonstrated the renewal of American-German unity within 
NATO and regarding Ukraine, the U.S. and German decisions to take only non-lethal 
measures confirm that Russia remains their priority relationship, with Ukraine seen as a 
subsidiary part of these relations.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ukraine came to the forefront of the world’s attention with Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and direct involvement in the insurrection in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s 
aggression not only led to questioning of the non-militarized U.S. and German response 
but revitalized interest in prior U.S. and German decisions, including removing Ukraine’s 
nuclear weapons in the early 1990s and keeping Ukraine out of NATO in the late 2000s. 
Given this new interest, this thesis undertook an analysis of these decisions regarding 
Ukraine. To remain unbiased, the thesis relies only on U.S. and Western European 
sources. Scholars offer three broad explanations for U.S. and German decisions regarding 
Ukraine. The first, rooted in realism, focuses on the two countries’ material and 
geostrategic positions relative to Russia and Ukraine. The second set of explanations, 
rooted in constructivism, focuses on particular ideas as driving decision makers. Third, 
scholars suggest two sets of domestic political explanations for foreign policy decision 
making. One set suggests that presidential and parliamentary systems produce different 
decisions regarding foreign policy. In the United States, the president has the ultimate 
voice on foreign policy. In parliamentary systems, the need to form governing coalitions 
can lead to compromise decisions. The other set of domestic explanations suggests that 
organized interest groups in the United States and Germany influenced decisions 
regarding Ukraine to favor their interests. 
This thesis evaluates these three sets of Western explanations of U.S. and German 
decision making regarding three crucial events: the 1992–1994 process of Ukrainian 
nuclear disarmament; the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit considering Ukraine’s path to 
membership; and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that began in 2014. It finds that the 
last 25 years of U.S. and German relations with Ukraine demonstrate different and 
sometimes inconsistent policies concerning the newly independent state. Both the United 
States and Germany, this research finds, too often have perceived Ukraine as only a 
subsidiary part of their broader relations with Russia, making each country’s relative 
power position the underlying, or permissive, cause of both U.S. and German policy 
decisions. These geopolitical considerations operated as a background factor in all the 
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cases, but were not necessarily the most important or direct causes of the ultimate 
decisions. Instead, ideas and domestic political institutions mattered most for some 
decisions, while U.S. and German material capabilities mattered more for others. This 
chapter reviews the findings of the case studies and concludes with recommendations for 
how to improve mutual understanding among the United States, Germany and Ukraine.  
A. UKRAINE’S DENUCLEARIZATION 
 Some scholars have argued that, because of Russian power and proximity, 
Ukraine made a strategic mistake in abandoning a nuclear arsenal that was the third 
largest in the world in 1994. In return, Ukraine received security assurances under the 
1994 Budapest Memorandum that the United States and the United Kingdom would act 
as guarantors of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These promises failed to deter 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and the Western guarantors failed to defend 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The detailed analysis in Chapter II of Ukraine’s 
denuclearization makes clear that the U.S. and Germany saw no alternative for the newly 
independent state than to relinquish its nuclear weapons. U.S. and German foreign policy 
decisions toward Ukrainian nuclear disarmament had multiple causes. Geostrategic 
position and ideas were the most important causes of U.S. and German foreign policy 
decisions in this case. U.S. decisions were shaped by its superpower position and security 
interests in preventing new nuclear states. However, it was the different perspectives of 
the Bush and Clinton teams, and the ideas of an arms control epistemic community that 
came to power under Clinton, that were determinative of the U.S. foreign policy that 
ultimately persuaded Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal to Russia. In contrast, 
German decisions were consistently affected by both its geostrategic position relative to 
Russia and a powerful set of ideas. 
 Their respective geostrategic positions and security interests affected U.S. and 
German decisions regarding the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament and determined the place 
and role of the United States, Germany, and Russia in the negotiation process with 
Ukraine. The U.S. global geostrategic position allowed the Bush administration to lead 
the denuclearization process and put pressure on Ukraine in 1992. Germany, in contrast, 
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in 1992 was a non-nuclear state with a huge presence of formerly Soviet, now Russian 
forces in East Germany. This position of weakness led it to support the U.S. and Russian 
efforts to remove nuclear weapons from Ukraine. For the United States, Ukrainian 
nuclear weapons were seen as an integral part of the long-standing and complex U.S.-
Soviet bilateral nuclear negotiations. Thus, the U.S. decisions toward Ukraine reflected 
its national security interest in maintaining nuclear stability through consolidation of all 
remaining nuclear weapons in one post-Soviet state—Russia—that had the best capacity 
to prevent uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. For Germany, its national security interests 
were to ensure the stability of Eastern Europe and prevent a potential conflict between 
Russia and Germany, in the first instance, and between Russia and Ukraine. Germany had 
to maintain good relations with Russia as the major and neighboring European nuclear 
power, so long as post-Soviet troops remained in the post-communist countries. 
 Different U.S. and German sets of ideas and values also provided important 
foreign policy inputs on Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. In the United States, 
longstanding ideas about nuclear danger underpinned the U.S. policy of nuclear non-
proliferation and strategic arms control during the Cold War. After the Cold War ended, a 
U.S. arms control epistemic community significantly influenced the Clinton 
administration’s approach, providing the ideas and technical expertise that would guide 
its policy. This group only influenced foreign policy decision making indirectly during 
the Bush administration by providing the technical basis for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Act. After Clinton became president in 1993, this community exercised 
direct influence on policy through their personal participation in the official negotiations 
with Ukraine. In Germany, the ideas of nuclear pacifism and non-proliferation reinforced 
German support for Ukraine’s denuclearization as well. These ideas had become 
dominant as the result of the long-standing activity of the German antinuclear movement, 
which shaped societal perceptions of nuclear weapons and energy; they would later 
become a fixture of German politics through the Green party. At the same time, German 
awareness of deep Russian unease about a reunified Germany contributed to the idea of a 
special friendship with Russia. The result was to make Ukraine a subsidiary part of 
Germany’s more important relations with Russia. 
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 Domestic politics played a different role in the U.S. and German denuclearization 
decisions. While the policy differences between the Bush and Clinton administrations 
were critical factors shaping the disarmament process, the lack of competing views 
among German coalition members yielded a stable and consistent approach to Ukraine. 
In the U.S. case, the interagency bargaining process within two different presidents’ 
administrations demonstrated that key decision makers, rather than geopolitical 
constraints, produced the specific policy outcomes. The Clinton administration moved 
away from the Bush administration’s Cold War thinking and Russia-first policy to a 
multifaceted view of Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics; its new conceptualization 
made the deal with Ukraine come to fruition. In the German case, its decision was driven 
by the consensus among governmental actors that followed the same anti-nuclear and 
Russia-first ideas.  
This case study confirms that the changes in U.S. and German power positions 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as ideas shaped the sequence and content of 
their decisions. U.S. decisions in the George H.W. Bush administration reduced Ukraine 
to a bothersome appendix to Russia; they failed to achieve its desired outcome of 
Ukrainian denuclearization. The new Clinton administration, in contrast, formulated its 
approach to Ukraine based on the ideas of the arms control epistemic community that 
emphasized a multidimensional U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. Germany, preoccupied with 
Soviet/Russian troops on its newly unified territory, played a supportive role but did not 
significantly influence the denuclearization process. In contrast, in the next case 
concerning whether Ukraine should be invited during the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit 
to begin the long process of joining the NATO alliance, Germany acted as an equal to the 
United States. 
B. UKRAINE “WILL BECOME” A NATO MEMBER 
The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit erupted into controversy when U.S. President 
George W. Bush decided to push for Ukraine to be offered a Membership Action Plan, 
contrary to what had been previously negotiated among the allies. The summit 
dramatically and publicly revealed divergent U.S. and German foreign policy approaches 
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regarding Ukraine and the compromise outcome—no immediate MAP but a statement 
that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO—pleased no one and infuriated Russia’s 
president. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess whether the summit’s decision not 
to invite Ukraine to begin a MAP either inspired or prevented Russia’s future revisionist 
activities in Eastern Europe. However, the event did reveal disunity within NATO allies, 
bringing into question the credibility of the alliance in the face of potential adversaries. 
The collision of American idealism and German economic pragmatism led to the 
disagreement between the United States and Germany regarding Ukraine. The U.S. 
support for Ukraine being offered a MAP reflected the primacy of ideas of democracy 
promotion and liberty underlying U.S. support for NATO enlargement. This ideological 
cause contrasts with Germany’s decision making process, wherein its economic interests 
and power relative to Russia, and the influence of coalitional politics, determined the 
outcome.  
While Germany’s enormous economic power became the cornerstone of its 
foreign policy decision regarding Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit, the U.S. geostrategic 
position had little influence on its decision. For Germany, significant growth of its 
national economic capabilities caused its transformation into the leading geo-economic 
power in the European Union, one that exercised embedded hegemony.517 Consequently, 
national power and economic interests were the crucial factors in its opposition to the 
U.S. stance on Ukraine. Even though Germany’s power allowed it to be more 
independent of the United States in foreign policy decisions, its weaker geostrategic 
position relative to Russia contributed to its fear of possible Russian revisionist reactions 
to NATO expansion to Ukraine. In opposing a MAP for Ukraine, Germany sought to 
protect its economic and security interests, once again viewing good relations with Russia 
as more important than with Ukraine. 
Ideas of democracy promotion and freedom played a key role in Bush’s support 
for Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In the United States, the decision on Ukraine 
reflected Bush’s ideational approach to foreign policy and the success of an epistemic 
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community that favored NATO enlargement. This group of experts, using its direct and 
indirect influence, provided the rationale and roadmap for the policy of NATO 
enlargement to the East and the ideological basis for the U.S. decision at the 2008 
summit. In Germany, in contrast, longstanding ideas collided with new economic 
interests. The German decision toward Ukraine revealed an uncomfortable tension 
between the longstanding idea of special Russo-German relations and the ideas of 
transatlanticism and European integration as the twin pillars of German security. As 
NATO enlargement to Ukraine could negatively impact German-Russian economic and 
energy relations, Berlin chose to protect its economic ties and special relations with 
Moscow.  
Domestic politics played only a complementary role strengthening the primary 
decisions of the United States and Germany at the Bucharest Summit. In the United 
States, key officials fell in line behind President Bush’s beliefs in promoting democracy 
via NATO enlargement to the East. In the German case, the grand right-left coalition 
between the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party put the SPD’s 
Steinmeier in charge of the Foreign Ministry. From this strong position, he promoted his 
party’s longstanding pro-Russian policy of Ostpolitik and persuaded Chancellor Merkel 
to postpone indefinitely a MAP for Ukraine. This position was reinforced through the 
pro-Russian lobbying efforts of German business interests. While organized interest 
groups in the United States had little influence on the U.S. decision, business lobbies in 
Germany significantly contributed to the overall geo-economic and pro-Russian direction 
of German foreign policy. It is likely that powerful business lobbies caused German 
politicians to calculate the effect of NATO’s decision on Ukraine would have on 
German-Russian bilateral relations. 
The Bucharest Summit confirmed the existence of deep U.S.-German disunity. 
During the 1990s, U.S. and German decision makers had agreed on the rationale for 
NATO’s eastward enlargement. The Bush administration’s inversion of Iraq and 
neoconservative ideology caused a deep rift with Germany, adding a new vulnerability to 
the transatlantic security architecture. The allies’ disagreement over a path to NATO for 
Ukraine was caused by the collision of U.S. idealism and German geo-economic realism. 
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Ukraine acquired a new significance for the two allies in 2014 when Russia invaded 
Ukraine.  
C. RUSSIA’S 2014 INVASION OF UKRAINE 
Russia’s war against Ukraine raises the stakes for the West’s response, as it is not 
just an issue of Ukraine’s bilateral relations with the United States and Germany but 
rather an international challenge to European peace and the transatlantic security 
architecture. The United States and Germany were united not only in deeming Russian 
aggression to be unacceptable but also in limiting their response to economic sanctions, 
non-lethal aid to Ukraine, and diplomatic resolution of the conflict. At the time of 
writing, in late 2017, this unified American-European response to Russia’s aggressive 
actions has failed to de-escalate or resolve the conflict. The limited U.S. response and 
decision to have Germany lead the allied efforts to end the conflict reflect President 
Obama’s pragmatic realism and perception of Ukraine as only a secondary concern to his 
nation’s interests. Germany’s active engagement in the peaceful resolution of the conflict, 
in contrast, suggests a deeper change in Germany’s view of Russia and of its own role in 
European security. Germany turned away from letting its economic interests drive its 
policy in regard to Russia and Ukraine and returned to its “civilian power” approach as a 
result of Russia’s aggression. Even though Germany demonstrates leadership and 
tenacity in seeking resolution of the conflict, it is this very idea of Germany as a peaceful, 
civilian power that has led Germany to favor economic over military power. This is turn 
physically constrains its ability to undertake military action against other countries, let 
alone its nuclear armed Russian neighbor. 
D. LESSONS LEARNED 
The results of this research point to a number of lessons that should be learned 
and recommendations that should be taken into account in developing Ukraine’s bilateral 
and multilateral relations with Western states.  
1. Despite all the debates between realist and liberal theorists, relative power and 
material interests are important sources of U.S. and German foreign policy decisions 
toward Ukraine. These factors cannot be ignored if U.S. and German decisions regarding 
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Ukraine intersect with the interests of Russia. In making decisions regarding Ukraine, the 
United States and Germany calculate their power positions and security interests relative 
to Russia. This calculation takes into account Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower 
with the largest military in Europe, the absence of significant U.S. leverage over Russia 
in the latter’s economic and energy relations, the enormous Russo-German economic and 
energy interdependence, Germany’s geographic proximity to Russia, and its non-nuclear 
status and weak military power. These factors influence the United States and Germany 
to take policy decisions regarding Ukraine that avoid a significant escalation with 
Ukraine’s more powerful neighbor Russia. Realists would expect the United States and 
Germany only to change their view of Ukraine if any of the three of them significantly 
strengthens their economic and military power or if Russia loses its material power. 
Material factors place definite constraints on the West’s support of Ukraine and rule out 
the use of military force in defense of countries outside the NATO alliance. 
2. The constructivist focus on ideas helps us to better understand other, non-
geopolitical sources of U.S. and German foreign policies concerning Ukraine when use of 
force is not a consideration. States’ foreign policy decisions are the product of ideas and 
domestic politics. This finding allows us to know states’ interests and priorities in foreign 
policy making, enabling better prediction in other scenarios of their policy choices. The 
dominant ideas of the United States and Germany result from domestic social practices, 
national historical experience, and long-standing mutual cooperation within multilateral 
institutions. In the United States, epistemic communities may also produce specific 
policies that promote alternative and innovative ideas or change politicians’ existing 
perceptions of security challenges. Thus, it is highly important to take the role of ideas 
into account when analyzing previous U.S. and German policies or when seeking to 
predict their future decisions. 
3. The different foreign policy making institutions in democracies significantly 
impacted how U.S. and German decisions regarding Ukraine were made. The preceding 
analysis clarifies how the U.S. presidential system allows key members of the U.S. 
government to initiate and conduct debates over various foreign policy proposals. 
However, the president’s status as the ultimate decision maker determines his last word in 
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foreign policy choices. Understanding of a president’s and his team members’ 
professional experience, as well as a history of previous analogous decisions, may help 
predict future decisions. The cases examined here demonstrate that when a president has 
taken too personal an approach to foreign policy decisions, uncontested by other 
members of the government, the outcomes were not positive for Ukraine. Instead, a 
debate between key foreign policy officials, with different expertise and views on 
Ukraine and Russia, might produce decisions more favorable to Ukraine.  
Unlike the United States, Germany’s foreign policy making institutions within its 
parliamentary system are highly dependent on the composition of a coalitional 
government. When one political party dominates the government, the federal chancellor 
can operate similar to the U.S. president and be the final foreign policy decision maker. 
In the presence of a coalition government, compromise is to be expected. In cases where 
there is a grand coalition of two major political parties, a duumvirate of the federal 
chancellor and foreign minister results, and often implies tension over foreign policy and 
increased calculation of coalitional support for particular decisions. Thus, the 
understanding of past and future German foreign policy decisions on Ukraine requires an 
additional focus on the ideology of political parties that appoint the federal chancellor 
and foreign minister to the government. 
4. Organized interest groups in the United States and Germany are a factor in 
influencing states’ foreign policies, though this study failed to find direct evidence that 
they are important causes of the decisions examined. Although this factor failed to define 
U.S. and German decisions in all the cases studied, this may result from their having 
limited interests in Ukraine’s denuclearization and membership in NATO. Their efforts to 
water down U.S. and German sanctions, however, was evident and somewhat successful, 
suggesting that their influence may be more considerable on other issues. 
5. Unexpected events that need immediate foreign policy decisions, such as 
Russia’s implication in the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight 17, may not coincide with 
standard foreign policy assumptions and predictions. The MH17 case demonstrated that 
Russia’s aggression directly affected Europe, not just Ukraine. Europeans would not be 
safe while Russia used military force and backed armed separatists in the Donbass. That 
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turned off the pragmatic calculation of economic interests and turned on the calculation 
of all-European security interests. 
6. Many would say that treating Ukraine as a secondary interest compared to 
Russia promoted stability and security in Europe since 1991. However, the Russia-
Ukraine conflict demonstrates the opposite. Providing privileges to great powers in their 
spheres of influences does not necessarily prevent war. For the United States and 
Germany, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an important moment to reconsider 
geostrategic priorities in the European region and develop a new multidimensional 
approach to Ukraine. Only U.S. and Germany’s active and strong involvement in the 
resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict would ensure the de-escalation and stabilization 
in the region.  
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